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Retroactive Application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to
Pending Cases
Michele A. Estrin
INTRODUCTION

The lOlst Congress, responding to a stream of Supreme Court decisions that significantly eroded the rights and remedies of plaintiffs in
employment discrimination actions, 1 passed the Civil Rights Act of
1990.2 Congress sought not only to overrule these cases as they apply
to future instances of discrimination, but also to nullify the effect of
the holdings on past and pending cases. The statute's retroactive provisions stirred debate and disagreement as representatives grappled
with concerns of fairness and constitutionality. 3 President Bush eventually vetoed the Act, 4 labeling it a "quota bill," and created an acrimonious standoff with Congress. Congress failed to override the veto. 5
Congress resurrected the Act in 1991,6 and it became the focal
1. See Independent Fedn. of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989) (holding that
prevailing plaintiffs may not seek attorney's fees from intervenors); Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, prohibiting discrimination in contracts, applies only to hiring decisions and not to postformation actions); Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755 (1989) (holding that third parties challenging an affirmative action consent decree can
bring a collateral action to challenge the settlement); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S.
900 (1989) (holding that the deadline for filing a challenge to a seniority system begins to run
when the practice is adopted and not when workers are adversely impacted); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (overruling Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971), by shifting the burden of proof to employees in disparate impact cases to show that an
employer's practice is not a business necessity); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989) (holding that an employer is not liable for making a biased employment decision as long
as the same decision would have been made without the discriminatory factors). Congress' response also involved three earlier decisions: Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S.
437 (1987); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986); and Evans v. JeffD., 475 U.S. 717
(1986).
2. See 136 CoNG. REc. S15,407 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1990) (recording the Senate vote on the
final version of the bill (S. 2104)); 136 CONG. REc. H9994-95 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1990) (recording
the House vote on S. 2104). The language of S. 2104 appears in the Conference Report, H.R.
CoNF. REP. No. 856, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-13, reprinted in 136 CoNG. REc. H9552-55 (daily
ed. Oct. 12, 1990).
3. See, e.g., H.R. 4000, The Civil Rights Act of 1990: Joint Hearing: Before the Comm. on
Education and Labor and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Civil Rights Act of 1990: Hearing Before the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources on S. 2104, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
4. President's Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Civil Rights Act of
1990, 26 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 1632-34 (Oct. 22, 1990), reprinted in 136 CONG. REc.
S16,457-58 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990).
5. 136 CoNG. REc. Sl6,589 (daily ed. Oct 24, 1990).
6. 137 CoNG. REc. H53 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1991) (noting its introduction as H.R. 1, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess.). The Civil Rights Act as passed is Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)
(to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1992)).
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point of the nation's civil rights agenda. During the lengthy compromise process, lawmakers dropped the explicit retroactivity provisions
and instead provided that the Act would be effective on its date of
enactment. 7 This formulation leaves unclear whether the law applies
retroactively to cases pending on the date of enactment or whether the
Act only applies to cases arising thereafter. Unable to agree or compromise on this issue, Congress dodged the dilemma and left it to the
federal courts for resolution. Since passage of the Act, federal courts
have split on the issue. 8
A retroactive law "gives to preenactment conduct a different legal
effect from that which it would have had without the passage of the
statute." 9 Despite a general presumption against retroactive lawmaking, the Constitution does not prohibit Congress from applying civil
statutes to cases arising prior to a law's enactment. 10 A statute may
raise retroactivity issues in one of two ways: (1) when Congress explicitly makes the bill effective on a date prior to the date of enactment, as in the vetoed 1990 Act; and (2) when Congress makes the bill
effective on its date of enactment and declines explicitly to state
7. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 402(a), 105 Stat. 1099 (1991).
8. As of April 17, 1992, 49 federal courts had ruled against retroactivity and 35 had ruled in
favor of it, according to the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. Ruth Marcus, A
Percolating Legal Dispute on Civil Rights, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1992, at A21.
The Supreme Court has remanded three Title VII cases to the circuit courts for resolution in
light of the 1991 Act. See Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1255 (1992); Holland v. First
Va. Banks, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1152 (1992); Gersman v. Group Health Assn., 112 S. Ct. 960 (1992).
The Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have held that the Act does not apply retroactively.
See Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th. Cir. 1992); Mozee v. American Commercial
Marine Serv. Co., FS Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1201 (7th Cir. 1992); Fray v. Omaha World
Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992). See infra section 11.C.
For examples of district courts that have applied the act retroactively, see Grahm v. Bodine
Elcc. Co., 782 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp 1302
(N.D. Cal. 1992); King v. Shelby Medical Ctr., 779 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ala. 1991); Mojica v.
Gannett Co., 779 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Bristow v. Drake Street, Inc., 57 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1367 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distributions Inc., 57 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA).1025 (E.D. Ariz. 1991); La Cour v. Harris Co., 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 622 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
For examples of courts holding that the Act does not apply to pending cases, see Burchfield v.
Derwinski, 782 F. Supp. 532 (D. Colo. 1992); Khandelwal v. Compuadd Corp., 780 F. Supp.
1077 (E.D. Va. 1992); Hansel v. Public Serv. Co., 778 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Colo. 1992); Van Meter
v. Barr, 778 F. Supp. 83 (D.D.C. 1991); Johnson v. Rice, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 31
(S.D. Ohio 1992); High v. Broadway Indus., Inc., 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1159 (W.D.
Mo. 1992); James v.. American Intl. Recovery, Inc., 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1226 (N.D.
Ga. 1991).
Additionally, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has determined that
the law does not reach pending cases, and in so doing has affected the outcomes of an estimated
400-500 pending cases. EEOC Declares 1991 Civil Rights Act Does Not Apply to Pre-Act Conduct,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Jan. 2, 1992, at A-8. See infra notes 140 and 178 and accompanying
text.
9. Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality ofRetroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692, 692 (1960).
10. In Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), the Supreme Court held that the ex post
facto clause, U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, applies only to criminal laws.
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whether or not the bill should be applied to cases pending in the
courts, as in the 1991 Act. In either instance, retroactive application
nullifies the effect of contrary Court decisions, and inevitably one
party or class of parties must bear the burden of this restructuring of
rights and interests. The Supreme Court has generally approved of
retroactivity in the first instance, 11 yet faced with the second type of
retroactivity the Court has two conflicting presumptions, one denouncing retroactivity and one presuming retroactive effect. The
Court has declined to resolve this conflict.
The controversy surrounding the question of retroactive application of the Civil Rights Act stems from the current conflict between
the Supreme Court and Congress over the interpretation of federal
statutes. In response to the Court's narrow interpretation of certain
statutes, Congress has increasingly resorted to overruling those decisions it finds unfavorable. 12
This Note addresses the applicability of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 to cases pending on the Act's date of enactment. Part I discusses
current Supreme Court doctrine on the issue. This Part finds that the
Court has endorsed two conflicting views on retroactively applying
statutes to pending cases and that the lower federal courts consequently lack a principled framework for dealing with retroactivity issues in the 1991 Act. Part II describes the battle over the Civil Rights
Acts of 1990 and 1991 and the subsequent confusion over the enacted
statute's reach. This Part finds that Congress provided conflicting textual guidance and useless legislative history, both of which fail to resolve the retroactivity issue. Part III rejects the use of a presumption
to resolve the retroactivity question and instead provides an analytic
framework for deciding the appropriate application of the Civil Rights
Act. This approach acknowledges the potential dangers of retroactivity but requires courts to assess whether or not these risks should be
determinative in the context of a given statute and cases arising under
it. This Note concludes that courts should decide cases arising under
the Act by applying the law in effect at the time of decision. Such
application does not interfere with significant equitable or constitutional concerns, but rather promotes the goals of efficiency and
fairness.

I.

R.ETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
'

When faced with an ambiguous law, courts often tum to the canons of construction, time-honored "rules of thumb" for statutory in11. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984) (rejecting
a due process challenge to a federal statute that retroactively imposed liability on employers who
withdrew from multiemployer pension plans).
12. See infra note 115; see also Abner J. Mik.va & Jeff Bleich, When Congress Overrules the
Court, 19 CAL. L. REv. 729, 748 n.103 (1991).
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terpretation. 13 Karl Llewellyn noted that "there are two opposing
canons on almost every point," 14 and this observation holds true
where retroactivity issues arise. The Supreme Court has endorsed a
presumption that instructs judges to read statutes prospectively in the
absence of legislative direction to the contrary, as well as a maxim that
obligates courts to apply the law in effect at the time they render a
decision. Section I.A presents the Supreme Court's doctrine on retroactivity, in which the clash of two distinct lines of cases demonstrates
the tensions surrounding the issue. Section I.B discusses federal court
interpretations of the Supreme Court's alternate approaches and concludes that the current doctrine is not only unworkable but also doctrinally unjustifiable. Section I.C discusses the historical bias against
retroactive laws reflected in the presumption against retroactivity.
This section reveals the flaws of this presumption, manifested in the
canon requiring a clear statement from Congress on retroactivity.
This Part concludes that, because the Court has endorsed two conflicting views on retroactively applying statutes to pending cases, the lower
federal courts lack guidance for dealing with retroactivity issues in the
1991 Act.
A.

The Court's Dueling Doctrines

The Supreme Court speaks with two voices when it comes to applying ambiguous statutes retroactively. On the one hand, the Court
has long eschewed applying statutes retroactively in the absence of
congressional direction. On the other hand, the Court has also ordered courts to apply the law in effect at the time of decision, an "ancient principle" 15 that necessarily results in retroactive application of
statutes. This contradictory stance has caused confusion, and today
confronts courts trying to resolve whether to apply the Civil Rights
Act to pending cases.
The Court recently reasserted the presumption against retroactivity in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 16 stating that
"[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law" and that, as a result, "congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed
13. WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIPP. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 639 (1988). Canons can be used as
intrinsic aids to gamer meaning from a statute's words (e.g., expressio unius, the inclusion of one
thing indicates exclusion of the other), or they may direct a court to subject-matter oriented
policy preferences (e.g., statutes should be interpreted to avoid constitutional conflicts). See generally id. at 639-96.
14. Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and The Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401 (1950).
15. PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 369 n.4 (3d ed. 1988) ("[C]ourts are obligated to apply law (otherwise valid) as
they find it at the time of their decision, including when a case is on review, the time of the
appellate judgment.").
16. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
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to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result." 17
Accordingly, the Court held that, without explicit congressional authorization, the Department of Health and Human Services could not
promulgate retroactive rules. Although the case dealt with retroactive
rulemaking, it reflected the long-accepted canon of construction that a
law will not be applied retroactively unless Congress expressly commands such an application. 18 This presumption acts as a "clear statement rule" 19 : it refuses to attribute an intent to Congress without
explicit authorization. A clear statement rule puts priority on the text
of a statute, rather than allowing courts to reason from a statute's purpose and legislative history.20
Retroactivity concerns are not so easily resolved, however, because
an alternate maxim commands courts to apply the law in effect at the
time they render a decision. This competing presumption first arose in
United States v. Schooner Peggy, 21 in which the Court had to decide
whether to apply a newly enacted treaty to a pending case. Speaking
for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall said that "if subsequent to the
judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be
obeyed, or its obligation denied." 22 Since the treaty expressly mandated its application to pending cases, Marshall applied the law retroactively. The case, however, did not address whether a change in law
could be applied to pending cases if there were no explicit language
commanding that effect.
The Court eventually addressed this open question in Thorpe v.
Housing Authority of Durham, 23 in which a tenant who had been
17. 488 U.S. at 208. Bowen concerned government reimbursement to health care providers
for expenses involved in providing medical services to Medicare beneficiaries. In 1981, the Secretary of Health and Human Services issued regulations that changed the methods used to calculate reimbursements. Hospitals brought suit, and the rule was subsequently stricken by the
federal district court because the Secretary failed to follow proper administrative rulemaking
procedures. The Secretary reissued the rule in 1984 and retroactively recollected the sums paid
to the hospitals under the district court's decision. The Court enjoined such retroactive
rulemaking.
18. E.g., "Statutes are not to be given retroactive effect •.• unless the legislative purpose so to
do plainly appears." United States v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 276 U.S. 160, 162-63 (1928); see
also Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913); United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. United States ex rel Struthers Wells Co., 209 U.S. 306, 314 (1908);
White v. United States, 191 U.S. 545, 552 (1903).
19. See generally Note, Intent, Clear Statements. and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 905 (1982).
20. Id. at 898.
21. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801). The circuit court had determined that a French vessel
seized by an American ship on the high seas was properly condemned, and therefore forfeited to
the United States. While the case was pending before the Supreme Court, the United States and
France signed a treaty in which all property captured and not yet "definitively condemned" was
to be restored to France.
22. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 110.
23. 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
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evicted from low-income housing for organizing a tenant's association
brought suit, claiming a violation of her First Amendment rights.
While her case was pending before the Supreme Court, the Department of Housing and Urban Development issued new procedural requirements to precede the initiation of eviction proceedings. Although
the regulations did not expressly state whether they applied to pending
cases, the Court applied the new regulation retroactively, holding that
"[t]he general rule ... is that an appellate court must apply the law in
effect at the time it renders its decision." 24 Under this formulation,
pending cases are decided under existing law25 enacted after the accrual of the cause of action, with or without words to that effect.
In Bradley v. School Board, 26 the Court reinforced Thorpe by rejecting the "contention that a change in the law is to be given effect in
a pending case only where that is the clear and stated intention of the
legislature."27 The Court stated that "even where the intervening law
does not explicitly recite that it is to be applied to pending cases, it is
to be given recognition and effect."28 The case involved a desegregation suit brought by black parents against the city of Richmond. The
district court, relying on common law, had awarded the plaintiff class
attorneys' fees. 29 The appellate court reversed the award, stating that
Congress, and not the courts, should authorize such fees. 30 However,
during the pendency of the appeal, Congress enacted the Education
Amendments of 1972, which granted federal courts the authority to
award reasonable attorney's fees when appropriate in school desegregation cases. 31
The Supreme Court retroactively applied the attorney's fees statute, holding that "a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it
renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice
or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary." 32
The Court did not hold that courts must always apply new laws to
pending cases but that, when the legislative history supports either position, there is implicit support for applying the statute to pending
cases. 33 In this instance, the Court chose not to read "into the statute
the very fee limitation that Congress eliminated. "34
24. 393 U.S. at 281.
25. The Court did not distinguish between statutes and administrative regulations. See 393
U.S. at 282.
26. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
27. 416 U.S. at 715.
28. 416 U.S. at 715.
29. See 416 U.S. at 706-08.
30. See 416 U.S. at 708-09.
31. Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 718, 86 Stat. 235, 369 (repealed 1978).
32. 416 U.S. at 711.
33. See 416 U.S. at 715-16 & n.21.
34. 416 U.S. at 716 n.23.
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Bradley stands for the proposition that laws will generally be applied retroactively unless Congress directs otherwise or if doing so will
result in "manifest injustice." The Court sets forth three means of
identifying "manifest injustice" that would preclude retroactive application of a law: (1) the nature and identity of the parties; (2) the nature of the rights affected; and (3) the impact of the change in law on
preexisting rights. 35 This test may eliminate the inequities caused by
application of a stringent antiretroactivity presumption. In Bradley,
the Court found no manifest injustice. First, the litigation pitted a
publicly funded governmental entity with vast resources against children who had been denied their constitutional right to nondiscriminatory education and who lacked the same ability to promote their
interests. 36 Unlike a routine private lawsuit between individuals, the
case involved plaintiffs acting as private attorneys general to enforce a
policy upon which Congress placed high priority. 37 The Court analogized the situation in Bradley to that described in Schooner Peggy,
where Chief Justice Marshall asserted that in areas of "great national
concern[] ... the court must decide according to existing laws." 38
Second, in looking at the nature of the rights affected, the Court acknowledged that it would refuse to apply a change in law to a pending
action where "to do so would infringe upon or deprive a person of a
right that had matured or become unconditional." 39 The Court did
not find, however, that the Richmond School Board had any matured
or unconditional right to the public funds that would go to pay attorney's fees. 40 Third, the Court determined that the law did not impose
new or unanticipated obligations on a party without notice. 41 The
Board could have been responsible for attorney's fees under common
law theories, and it was unlikely that the Board's actions would have
been any different had the statute been in effect.4 2
The Bowen and Bradley presumptions simply cannot be reconciled.43 Bowen presumes that all statutes are prospective unless Congress explicitly states otherwise. Bradley presumes that all statutes
apply to pending cases unless Congress explicitly states otherwise or if
35. See 416 U.S. at 717.
36. See 416 U.S. at 718.
37. See 416 U.S. at 719.
38. 416 U.S. at 719 (quoting United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110
(1801)).
39. 416 U.S. at 720.
40. See 416 U.S. at 720.
41. See 416 U.S. at 720-21.
42. See 416 U.S. at 721.
43. A court could come to an antiretroactivity conclusion under either presumption. Under
the Bradley presumption, a court could avoid retroactivity through the manifest injustice test.
However, a court cannot adhere to Bradley without assuming the validity of the Schooner Peggy
tradition.

2042

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 90:2035

manifest injustice would result from retroactive application. Thus,
when a court confronts congressional silence, each presumption points
in a different direction: Bowen presumes prospectivity, while Bradley
presumes retroactivity. The first presumption relies on a clear statement by Congress, while the second encourages courts to reason
through the "manifest injustice" test.
The Bowen and Bradley holdings create confusion because they
find their support in competing conceptions of congressional and judicial roles. Under Bowen, the Court is the faithful agent of Congress,
llilwilling to act without congressional authorization. Under Bradley,
the Court carries out the legislative purpose by examining the equities
involved in a particular case. Unfortunately, the Court has failed to
offer any rationales for reconciling these conflicting rules of construction and has instead allowed them to coexist.
Attempts to distinguish the presumptions on the basis of their facts
provide little guidance. To begin with, the presumptions are broad
statements of legal principles whose wording implies that they are not
fact-specific but rather intended to apply to all interpretive problems
involving retroactivity. 44 Despite the different contexts in which these
cases arise, the Court uses these presumptions without differentiating
between administrative and statutory law cases.45 Furthermore, the
Court plucked the principles of Bradley and Bowen from precedent,
without relying on the facts of prior cases as determinative. Not surprisingly, federal courts have largely divorced the holdings from their
facts, and opinions often refer to either presumption simply as the
''Bradley" or ''Bowen" test. 46 Analysis of the presumptions is all the
more difficult because the Court never explained why it chose the presumption it did, nor did it explain how to select between the presumptions. This lack of legal reasoning is one of the pitfalls inherent in a
presumption: as a mechanically applied rule, it discourages analysis.
The Court itself recently acknowledged that the two presumptions
conflict in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 47 suggesting further that there is no principled means of selecting between
the presumptions. In Bonjorno, the plaintiff attempted to have a
44. "[A] court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so
would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary." Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711. "[C]ongressional enactments and administrative rules will not
be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result." Bowen, 488
U.S. at 208.
45. Thus, both Thorpe. dealing with administrative regulations, and Bradley, dealing with a
statute, use the same presumption of retroactivity. Thorpe and Bowen both concern administrative regulations but use different presumptions. The Court in Thorpe noted that its reasoning
"has been applied where the change was constitutional, statutory, or judicial." 393 U.S. at 282
(footnotes omitted).
46. See supra note 8 (cases interpreting the retroactivity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, in
which courts' decisions hinge on whether they "pick" Bowen or Bradley).
47. 494 U.S. 827 (1990).
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postjudgment interest statute retroactively applied to his federal antitrust judgment. The statute was enacted while the case was on appeal.
Noting that the Bradley and Bowen cases are in "apparent tension," 48
the Supreme Court nonetheless declined to resolve these contrary presumptions, holding only that "where the congressional intent is clear,
it governs. " 49 In refusing to apply the amended statute to the pending
case, the Court concluded that "the plain language of both the original
and amended versions of [the statute] evidence clear congressional intent that [the] amended [statute] is not applicable to judgments entered before its effective date." 50
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia pointed to the "irreconcilable
contradiction" 51 between Bowen and Bradley and urged the Court to
resolve the dispute by abolishing the Bradley rule and returning to the
age-old tradition of prospective lawmaking. 52 Scalia's argument centered on discrediting the precedential support of the Bradley/Thorpe
line of cases. 53 He described retroactivity as a policy "contrary to fundamental notions of justice," and thus not within the probable contemplation of legislators. 5 4
Overall, the Supreme Court has not only failed to resolve the controversy, but has also failed to dig underneath the weak foundations
which uphold the presumptions. Presumptions are supposed to help
judges resolve sticky situations, yet these presumptions lead courts
into a veritable swamp of confusion. In the end, litigants pay for the
confusion, finding themselves subject to federal courts' policy
preferences.
B. Lower Federal Court Interpretations
The Supreme Court's two conflicting approaches force federal
courts faced with the retroactivity dilemma to pick one presumption
over the other, yet they have no guidance for choosing between the
presumptions. Thus, federal courts possess broad discretion to justify
their decisions with a Supreme Court-sanctioned solution. Each of the
48. 494 U.S. at 837.
49. 494 U.S. at 837. The Court explicitly declined to reconcile the two lines of precedent
represented by Bradley and Bowen. 494 U.S. at 837.
50. 494 U.S. at 838. In dissent, Justice White did not find any clear congressional intent and
would thus have applied the Bradley rule. White did not feel that any manifest injustice would
result from applying the statute to the case. "It is difficult to see how manifest injustice could be
worked except by refusing to apply [the] amended [statute] to this case," because the Court's
approach sanctions the very result Congress intended to prevent. 494 U.S. at 869 (White, J.,
dissenting).
51. 494 U.S. at 841 (Scalia, J., concurring).
52. Scalia stated that the rule of prospective legislation "has been applied, except for these
last two decades of confusion, since the beginning of the Republic and indeed since the early days
of the common law." 494 U.S. at 841 (concurring opinion).
53. 494 U.S. at 844-53 (Scalia, J., concurring).
54. 494 U.S. at 855 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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presumptions has found adherents in the federal courts, and the
Bonjorno decision has only magnified the irreconcilable nature of the
competing doctrines. Fallout from the Civil Rights Act traces the
dual approaches. 55
The federal courts wrestled with a similar problem in their deliberations over the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,56 enacted in response to Supreme Court interpretations of four civil rights statutes
covering federally funded institutions. These statutes prohibited discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance. 57 In Grove City College v. Bell, 5s the Supreme Court had
held the Title IX ban on sex discrimination in any "program or activity"59 to be program specific and not applicable to the institution at
large. 60 In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Da"one, 61 the Court extended
this program-specific interpretation to handicapped discrimination
claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 62 As a result,
hundreds of federally funded institutions were relieved of liability for
discrimination. For instance, if only a college's financial aid office received money, the rest of the institution remained beyond the reach of
Title IX.
In the Civil Rights Restoration Act, Congress quickly repudiated
this narrow interpretation of Title IX by defining "program or activity" to include all of an institution's operations. Congress found that
"certain aspects of recent decisions and opinions of the Supreme Court
have unduly narrowed or cast doubt upon the broad application of"
the civil rights laws. 63 As a result, Congress said, "legislative action is
necessary to restore the prior consistent and long-standing executive
branch interpretation ... of those laws as previously administered." 64
The Senate Report stated unequivocally that the Act was meant "to
overturn the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Grove City. " 65 Congress did not include any provision indicating that the Act should be
applied retroactively or prospectively.
SS. See infra section 11.C.
S6. Pub. L. No. 100-2S9, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C., 29
U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (1988)).
S7. Age Discrimination Act of 197S, 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1988); Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
§ S04, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988}; Education Amendments of 1972, tit. IX, 20 U.S.C. § 168l(a)
(1988); Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d} (1988).
S8. 46S U.S. SSS (1984).
S9. Education Amendments of 1972, § 901, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
60. See 46S U.S. at S70.
61. 46S U.S. 624 (1984).
62. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 3SS (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796(i)
(1988)).
63. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 2, 102 Stat. 28, 28 (1988).
64. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 2, 102 Stat. 28, 28 (1988).
6S. S. REP. No. 64, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 3.
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The Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have followed Bradley,
holding that the Restoration Act applied retroactively in the absence
of manifest injustice. 66 In Ayers v. Allain, 67 the plaintiff alleged that
Mississippi maintained a racially motivated dual system of education
which discriminated against black students. Initially analyzing the
case under the narrow Grove City standard, the district court found
for the defendants and dismissed the plaintiff's claim. After Congress
passed the Restoration Act, the Fifth Circuit examined the case and
chose to follow the Restoration Act, stating that Congress had repaired the Supreme Court's misreading of congressional intent. 68 The
court, in characterizing the congressional action as a return to previous law, looked to the Senate report and statements made during passage of the Act and determined that "[r]etroactive application of a
statute is appropriate when Congress enacts the statute to clarify the
Supreme Court's interpretation of previous legislation thereby returning the law to its previous posture." 69 The Ayers court gave great
weight to the underlying purpose of the Restoration Act, which was to
overrule the Supreme Court. This understanding thus distinguished
the Act from completely "new" legislation, where retroactivity is more
problematic.
Faced with the statute's ambiguity, the courts in Lussier v. Dugger7o and Leake v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center 71 relied heavily
on the words "restore" and "clarify" in the stated purpose of the Act
as expressions of Congress' intent to apply the law retroactively.72
Both courts asserted that these terms reflected Congress' desire to enforce its original intent and to reject the Supreme Court's subsequent
interpretation. 73 These arguments implicitly recognize the difference
between an overruling statute and a statute regulating new areas. In
enacting the Restoration Act, Congress intended to minimize the damage caused by Supreme Court misinterpretations; limiting the effect of
mistaken Court decisions on pending cases best fulfilled this goal.
Thus, these three circuits determined that retroactive application of
the Restoration Act would best further legislative ends without causing unjust results.74
66. Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661 (11th Cir. 1990); Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.
1990); Leake v. Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr., 869 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1989).
67. 893 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1990).
68. See 893 F.2d at 754.
69. 893 F.2d at 754-55.
70. 904 F.2d 661 (11th Cir. 1990).
71. 695 F. Supp. 1414 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), affd., 869 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1989).
72. 904 F.2d at 666; 695 F. Supp. at 1417. The purpose of the Act is to "restore the broad
scope of coverage and to clarify the application of ... section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973." Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-259, pmbl., 102 Stat. 28, 28 (1988).
73. See 904 F.2d at 666; 695 F. Supp. at 1417.
74. The Leake court followed the Bradley premise, but did not use the manifest injustice test.
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The Tenth Circuit is the only circuit that declined to apply the
Restoration Act retroactively to a pending case. In De Vargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 15 the court found a congressional purpose to overrule Grove City but no clear intent to apply the Act
retroactively. 76 The court compared the Restoration Act to other congressional amendments in which Congress had expressly specified the
Act's applicability to pending cases, and inferred that Congress would
have explicitly applied the statute retroactively if it had so intended. 77
Additionally, the court reasoned that the Restoration Act did not revive pre-Grove City law but rather was a new law, to which Congress
must clearly specify its intentions with regard to retroactive application. 78 Thus, in following the clear statement approach of Bowen, the
court was not persuaded to apply an overruling law retroactively because that approach "implicitly treats Congress as a court of revision
rather than as the law-making branch of the federal government." 79
After struggling to reconcile Bradley and Bowen, the De Vargas court
opted to follow the Bowen line of cases and agreed with Justice Scalia's
argument in Bonjorno that the presumption of prospective application
of statutes finds extensive support in history. so
In keeping with the premises of the clear statement rule endorsed
in Bowen, the De Vargas court ignored legislative history; if Congress
did not precisely spell out its intentions, the court would not read
them into the statute. In contrast, the other circuits looked to legislative history and the statute's overriding purpose as a guide in order to
most accurately implement the spirit of the legislation. These contrasting approaches in statutory construction taken by the federal
courts mirror the competing presumptions. A determination of which
presumption to apply necessarily reflects a court's approach to statutory construction, which in turn reflects deep-seated notions about the
role of courts in a tripartite system. The opposite outcomes among the
circuits reveals the unworkability of rules of construction lacking in
content - the inevitable consequences of the existing Supreme Court
doctrine. Before the Court follows Justice Scalia and adopts a strict
antiretroactivity presumption for ambiguous statutes, the Court must
determine exactly which values merit protection.
The Lussier court touched on the manifest injustice exception and found that no injustice would
result from retroactive application of the Act. 904 F.2d at 666.
75. 911 F.2d 1377 (10th Cir. 1990).
76. See 911 F.2d at 1385.
77. See 911 F.2d at 1385 & n.7.
78. See 911 F.2d at 1388.
79. 911 F.2d at 1388. This criticism fails to explain or even recognize the extreme deference
courts give to explicitly retroactive statutes. See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
80. See 911 F.2d at 1390. Since the court opted to follow the Bowen presumption, it did not
have to balance the "manifest injustice" factors of Bradley.
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C. Retroactivity and the Flaws of the Clear Statement Rule

"The principle that statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions operate retrospectively, is familiar to every law student. "8I This assertion reflects a historical bias against retroactive
legislation which stretches from the Roman Code to the English jurisprudence of Coke and Blackstone and on into the American legal tradition. 82 The American legal system evolved from the assumption
that courts find the law made by the legislature. 83 This strict dichotomy, in which courts discover the past and legislatures regulate the
future, disfavors retroactive laws. However, as this section demonstrates, courts accept retroactivity in a wide array of situations, and its
implementation often contributes to values central to the rule of law.
With the experience of tyranny behind them, the Framers of the
Constitution feared the excesses of legislative power. 84 As a result,
they drafted express prohibitions against ex post facto laws and bills of
attainder85 and forbade the states from impairing existing contractual
obligations. 86 The Framers did not, however, forbid retroactive federal statutes, 87 and in fact courts regularly uphold explicit retroactive
provisions88 such as those found in the original version of the Civil
Rights Act of 1990. 8 9 When Congress speaks clearly about its intent
to apply a law retroactively, courts defer and the traditional resistance
to retroactivity disappears. Through the years, opponents of explicitly
81. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982).
82. See generally Ray H. Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Legislation, 51
Nw. U. L. REV. 540 (1956) (providing a brief history of the bias against retroactive legislation).
83. EsKRJDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 13, at 241-43.
84. James Madison warned that !'[t]he legislative department is everywhere extending the
sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex." THE FEDERALIST No.
48, at 147 (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1981).
85. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. ("No bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed."). Bills of attainder are special acts of the legislature which impose punishment upon a
specific person without any conviction arising out of a judicial proceeding; ex post facto laws
inflict punishment on a person for an act which was innocent when committed. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 127, 580 (6th ed. 1990).
86. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10.
87. See supra note 10.
88. See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
89. As a constitutional matter, courts have approved of retroactivity as a helpful legislative
tool in a wide variety of situations. Retroactive curative laws are regularly upheld. These laws
"repair the consequences of legal accident or mistake" by ratifying prior official conduct or by
fixing an error in an administrative system. 2 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY
CoNSTRUCTlON § 41.01 (4th ed. 1986); Hochman, supra note 9, at 704. By permitting the legislature to correct statutory errors, courts fulfill the expectations of parties operating under the Jaw
and ensure that government runs smoothly. Courts similarly defer to emergency legislation,
where lawmakers are considered to be in the best position to promote public welfare during a
crisis, such as wartime or economic depression. Id. at 698-700. Finally, tax legislation is often
retroactive. See generally id. at 706-11. Outside of these regularly accepted contexts for retroactivity, the Court has also approved of retroactive laws which affect economic and social policy.
See infra note 92.
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retroactive provisions have challenged retroactive laws with the Due
Process Clause, but to little avail. 90 Currently, the Court uses a minimal rationality standard91 in cases of explicit retroactivity, a low level
of scrutiny which nearly all retroactive laws overcome. 92
Despite the deference given to these explicitly retroactive laws, the
Bowen presumption remains hostile to retroactivity in the context of
ambiguous statutes. Justice Scalia's attacks on the Bradley presumption, along with the Court's recent intimations of antiretroactivity sentiment, suggest that the presumption of retroactivity may soon be
severely limited, if not extinguished. Thus, a discussion of the values
embodied in Bowen is particularly appropriate and timely.
The Bowen approach cannot be justified on constitutional or policy
grounds. Although Bowen's clear-statement rule is cloaked in the
guise of neutrality - making it appear as if the Court is taking a
purely hands-off approach - the imppsition of the rule is itself a policy choice to avoid resolving statutory dilemmas. Such a policy creates a conundrum in which Congress leaves the issue to the courts,
and the courts give back to Congress a task which it cannot complete. 93 The two branches pass the issue back and forth, without ever
assessing its validity, impact, or necessity. "[W]hen Congress is unable to address a problem that arises within a statutory scheme and the
Court continues to 'remand' the problem to Congress by operating in
the clear-statement model, a substantive decision results without
either institution's explicitly confronting the choices implicated in that
decision." 94 In contrast, Bradley is not a clear-statement rule because
its presumption can be thwarted by manifest injustice as well as by
congressional intent. Although its presumption may be troubling, 95
Bradley's manifest injustice rule allows case-by-case adjudication, exactly the approach a clear-statement rule seeks to avoid.
90. "Since the New Deal era, retroactive statutes have become quite common, and in the
overwhelming majority of cases they have withstood constitutional challenges." EsKRIDGE &
FRICKEY, supra note 13, at 275.
91. "[R]etroactive legislation does have to meet a burden not faced by legislation that has
only future effects. . • • But that burden is met simply by showing that the retroactive application
of the legislation is itself justified by a rational legislative purpose." JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL.,
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 11.9 (3d ed. 1986) (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray
& Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984)).
92. See R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 728 (1984) ("[T]he strong deference accorded legislation in the field of national economic policy is no less applicable when that legislation is applied
retroactively."); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) ("[L]egislation
readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations."); see also Thomas v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 174 F.2d 711, 713 (3d Cir. 1949);
Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 260-61 (2d Cir. 1948) (federal court decisions
upholding retroactive application of the Portal-to-Portal Act).
93. Institutional limits on Congress mean that statutes often contain unresolved issues. See
infra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
94. Note, supra note 19, at 905.
95. See infra text accompanying note 234. This Note argues against using any presumption
to resolve the retroactivity issue in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
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Courts typically invoke clear-statement rules to ensure that Congress deliberates issues which contain potential constitutional concerns. 96 By forcing Congress to provide definitive guidance, a clearstatement rule allows courts to avoid interpretive searches into statutory meaning when they feel that a law perches precariously near constitutional limits.97 However, retroactive laws usually pass rational
basis review, 98 reaffirming that retroactivity does not inherently pose a
substantial threat to constitutional norms. Thus, constitutional due
process concerns do not explain the disparity between the extreme deference given to explicit retroactivity and the resistance pitted against
retroactive application of ambiguous statutes.99
· The lack of a constitutional underpinning suggests that equity concerns really underlie the Bowen presumption. Perhaps this standard
seeks to guard against potentially unfair results of retroactive laws,
which can disrupt settled expectations, deprive parties of notice, and
target vulnerable groups. too These are indeed valid concerns, but they
simply do not arise in every statute. tot In fact, the Bradley presumption probably arose as an implicit recognition that, in some situations,
retroactivity contains none of these risks and can serve legislative
goals. Furthermore, these potential inequities can just as easily result
from prospective laws, which can upset settled expectations, and retroactive judicial decisions, which may punish past behavior the defendant thought proper. to2
Moreover, the Bowen presumption fails to involve courts in any
examination of the effects of particular laws and instead applies a
stringent and unyielding test. Statutes differ in purpose and effect, yet
the clear-statement rule treats them all identically. In certain cases,
the Bowen presumption may prevent unjust application of laws. With
some statutes, however, retroactivity "can ... actually serve the cause
oflegality.... [I]t can serve to heal infringements of the principle that
like cases should receive like treatment."t 03 For these statutes, the
Bowen presumption uncritically sanctions harsh results. When a court
applies the clear statement rule to an ambiguous statute without justifi96. William V. Luneburg, Justice Rehnquist, Statutory Interpretation, the Policies of Clear
Statement, and Federal Jurisdiction, 58 IND. L.J. 211, 220 (1982).
97. Id. at 217.
98. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
99. Nor do separation-of-powers concerns underlie the presumption against retroactivity. In
the absence of any presumptions, courts interpret ambiguous statutes. Congressional silence is
not to be understood as an endorsement of a particular position. There is therefore no difference
between having no presumptions and having two conflic;ting presumptions.
100. These objections to retroactivity are set forth and questioned in Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 6 TExAs L. R.Ev. 409, 417-20 (1928).
101. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 is one such example. See infra section III.C.
102. See infra notes 239-46 and accompanying text.
103. LoN L. FuLLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 211 (rev. ed. 1969).
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cation, it avoids its judicial responsibility to interpret statutes. 104 By
refusing to engage in substantial interpretation, the Court may undermine legislative enactments.1os
II.

THE CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1991: OVERRULING THE
SUPREME COURT

When interpreting federal statutes, the Supreme Court frequently
reminds lawmakers that if they do not like a decision, they are free to
rewrite the statute. 106 Congress has increasingly overruled Court decisions it finds unfavorable, and each Congress since 1975 has overruled
an average of twelve Supreme Court decisions interpreting federal statutes.107 Congress is often explicit about its motives, claiming to be
restoring, amending, or clarifying existing laws. 108 The Civil Rights
Acts of 1990 and 1991 represent the most recent congressional disapproval of the Court's interpretation of federal statutes. Retroactivity
may potently diminish the impact of Supreme Court interpretations,
and Congress debated its application to the Civil Rights Act throughout the two years preceding the Act's passage. Section II.A describes
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act, with a focus on retroactivity
issues. Section II.B demonstrates that traditional and textual methods
of statutory interpretation fail to resolve the retroactivity issue. Section II.C analyzes the lower federal courts' approaches in deciding
whether the Civil Rights Act applies to pending cases. This Part demonstrates that Congress' ambiguity, along with the conflicting
Supreme Court doctrine, has led to contradictory outcomes among the
federal courts.
A.

Passage of The Civil Rights Act

During the 1989 term, the Supreme Court issued a rapid-fire succession of decisions which chipped away at the rights and remedies of
104. Id. at 94.
105. [T]he "clear statement" principle usually fails as a useful tool of construction because
it cannot demonstrate why the legislature would have wanted the court to hesitate just be·
cause the subject matter of the law is "sensitive." Likely it thinks that making hard deci·
sions in sensitive areas is what courts are for.
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 545 (1983) (footnote
omitted).
106. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989) ("[T]he legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done."). Patterson is
one of the decisions overruled by the Civil Rights Act. In contrast, only the herculean task of
constitutional amendment can overturn constitutional decisions.
107. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 101 YALE L.J.
331, 338 (1991).
108. See, e.g., Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, pmbl., 102 stat. 28,
28; see also Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 101, 104 Stat.
978, 978 (1990) ("The Congress finds that, as a result of the decision of the Supreme Court •••
legislative action is necessary to restore the original congressional intent in passing and amending
the [ADEA].").
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plaintiffs in employment discrimination actions. 109 In those decisions,
the Court consistently chose narrow interpretations of Title VII 110 and
section 1981. 111 The decisions ignited a massive lobbying effort by
civil rights groups to mitigate the effect of the rulings. 112 Riding this
momentum, Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative Augustus
Hawkins introduced the Civil Rights Act of 1990 in both the Senate
and House on February 7, 1990. 113 Almost immediately, the Bush
administration opposed the legislation, characterizing it as a "quota
bill" and suggesting that the Act's proposed damage remedies would
lead to excessive litigation. 11 4
In the 1990 Act, Congress openly expressed its hostility to the
Court's interpretations, declaring that "in a series of recent decisions
addressing employment discrimination claims under federal law, the
Supreme Court cut back dramatically on the scope and effectiveness of
civil rights protections [and that the Act would] restor[e] the civil
rights protections that were dramatically limited by those decisions."115 Congress further expressed its disapproval by making the
109. See supra note 1; see also Constance Baker Motley, The Supreme Court, Civil Rights
Legislation, and Deja Vu, 76 CoRNELL L. REV. 643 (1991):
Although the Court in each of these cases modestly claimed only to be following precedent,
history, or the plain meaning of the statutes before it, the Court succeeded in the course of
less than one month, in reshaping the civil rights landscape for those already facing a steep
incline in the road to fairness.
Id. at 655; cf. infra note 115 (cases overruled by Congress). But see Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 188 (1989) ("Neither our words nor our decisions should be interpreted as
signaling one inch of retreat from Congress' policy to forbid discrimination in the private, as well
as the public, sphere.").
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988). Title VII prohibits employment discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988). § 1981 states:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property
as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
112. See Bush Vetoes Job Bias Bill,· Override Fails, 1990 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 462 [hereinafter Bush Vetoes Job Bias Bill].
113. See supra note 2. In addition to overruling the objectionable Supreme Court decisions,
both the 1990 and 1991 Acts amend Title VII by allowing women and religious minority plaintiffs to seek compensatory and punitive damages for intentional discrimination (racial minorities
already have this remedy under § 1981) and providing the option of jury trials for plaintiffs
seeking these damages. The 1991 Act places caps on the amount of these damages that may be
awarded. Legislation has been introduced to overturn the caps. See infra note 132.
114. See Bush Vetoes Job Bias Bill, supra note 112, at 466.
115. S. 2104, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. § 2, reprinted in 136 CONG. REc. S1019 (daily ed., Feb. 7,
1990). In recent years, Congress has increasingly resorted to overruling Court opinions it finds
unfavorable. See, for example, the following civil rights statutory interpretations and overruling
statutes: Public Employees Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989), overruled by Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 621
(West Supp. 1992)); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989), overruled by Education of the
Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401 (West Supp. 1992)); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234 (1985), overruled by Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003,
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bill's provisions retroactive to actions pending or initiated on the dates
of the applicable Supreme Court rulings and by permitting the reopening of final judgments.116
Senators and Representatives challenged and debated 117 the 1990
bill's explicit retroactive provisions. The polarization of views hinged
largely on how one characterized the Act. Supporters of the retroactive provisions described the Act as restoring existing rights to unlucky plaintiffs whose claims fell under the Supreme Court
decisions. 118 In contrast, opponents of retroactivity tended to portray
the Act as a major rewriting of civil rights law which should thus only
apply prospectively. 11 9 In his veto message, President Bush specifically attacked the bill's "unfair retroactivity rules," without elaborating further. 120
100 Stat. 1807, 184S (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1988)); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992
(1984), overruled by Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, § 2,
100 Stat. 796, 796 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 141S (Supp. II 1990)); Grove City College
v. Bell, 46S U.S. SSS (1984), overruled by Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 1002S9, § 3, 102 Stat. 28, 28 (1988) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988)); City of Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. SS (1980), overruled by Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-20S,
§ 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)); United Air Lines v. McMann, 434
U.S. 192 (1977), overruled by Age Discrimination Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 9S-2S6,
§ 2, 92 Stat. 189, 189 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.A. (West Supp.
1992)); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 12S (1976), overruled by Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 9S-SSS, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(1988)); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Socy., 421 U.S. 240 (197S), overruled by Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-SS9, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West Supp. 1992)).
116. Section lS(a) provided that certain provisions of the Act "shall apply to all proceedings
pending on or commenced after'' the dates on which the Supreme Court issued the relevant
opinions. Section lS(b) vacated court orders entered between the dates of the Supreme Court
opinions and the Act's enactment which were based on Supreme Court standards. Section lS(c)
retroactively tolled the statute of limitations for claims not filed because of the prevailing
Supreme Court standards. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 8S6, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10, reprinted in
136 CoNG. REc. H9SS4 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1990).
117. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REc. H6771-72 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Goodling); 136 CoNG. REc. S9932-33 (daily ed. July 18, 1990) (statement of Sen. Murkowski); 136
CONG. REc. S9840-41 (daily ed. July 17, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum); 136 CONG. REC.
S3144-47 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
118. "(T]he legislation is restorative in purpose," H.R. CONF. REP. No. 8S6, lOlst Cong., 2d
Sess. 23, reprinted in 136 CONG. REc. H9SS8 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1990).
119. "[The Act] chang[es] the rules of the game midstream" 136 CONG. REC. H6766 (daily
ed. Aug. 3, 1990) (statement of Rep. Johnson).
120. President's Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Civil Rights Act of
1990, supra note 4, at 1634, reprinted in 136 CONG. REC. at Sl6,4S8.
Throughout the process, Congress narrowly fended off attacks on the retroactive provisions.
The House Judiciary Committee barely defeated, by an 18 to 18 vote, a proposal by Rep. Carlos
Moorhead, R.-Calif., to remove all retroactivity provisions. Bush Vetoes Job Bias Bill, supra note
112, at 469. Moorhead argued that a "major revision of civil rights laws should be prospective."
House Judiciary Committee Approves Omnibus Civil Rights Bill. 24-12, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), July 26, 1990, at A-9. Nonetheless, the Conference Report upheld the retroactivity provisions, explaining that "[t]he Supreme Court decisions overturned by this bill repudiated
well-settled case law which protected American workers against employment discrimination. In
the past year, hundreds of discrimination victims have had their claims dismissed, or their rights
and remedies otherwise impaired, as a direct result of the application of these decisions." H.R.
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Ultimately, the Senate failed - by one vote - to overrule the
presidential veto. 121 The Civil Rights Act resurfaced and passed in
1991, the result of a lengthy series of compromises between civil rights
advocates and leaders of business. 122 In the 1991 Act, retroactivity
remained one of the numerous topics Congress considered in the negotiations with the Administration. Initially, the House version of the
1991 bill, H.R. 1, tied retroactive provisions to the dates of the
Supreme Court decisions they overruled. 123 In an effort to make the
bill palatable to the administration, Representative Brooks introduced
a modified version of H.R. 1. 124 This modified version added explicit
antiquota language 125 and precluded retroactive application to plosed
cases in the absence of manifest injustice. 126 Under the modified verCoNF. REP. No. 856, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24, reprinted in 136 CoNG. RE.c. H9552, H9558
(daily ed. Oct. 12, 1990).
121. See 136 CoNG. RE.c. Sl6,589 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (recording vote of 66 to 34); Bush
Vetoes Job Bias Bill, supra note 112, at 469.
122. The Preamble was less strongly worded than the 1990 Preamble, but the sentiment was
the same. In the Act, Congres5 finds that
(1) additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and
intentional discrimination in the workplace;
(2) the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989) has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections; and
(3) legislation is necessary to provide additional protections against unlawful discrimination
in employment.
[The purposes of the Act are]
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment
in the workplace;
(2) to codify the concepts of "business necessity" and "job related" enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other
Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989);
(3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines for the adjudication of
disparate impact suits under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et
seq.); and
(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant
civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.
Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 2-3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991).
123. H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 15 (1991).
124. H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 137 CONG. RE.c. H3922-28 (daily ed. June 5,
1991).
125. Section 111 stated that
Nothing in the amendments made by this Act shall be construed ... to require, encourage,
or permit an employer to adopt hiring or promotion quotas on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, and the use of such quotas shall be deemed to be an unlawful employment practice under such title ..•.
H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 111(a)(2), reprinted in 137 CONG. RE.c. H3922, H3924 (daily ed.
June 5, 1991).
This provision did not assuage conservative interests. Attorney General Dick Thornburgh
said, "Nothing has changed. The president will veto any legislation which has undergone only
cosmetic changes and which still forces quotas." Joan Biskupic, Democrats Scramble for Cover
Under GOP "Quota" Attacks, 49 CoNG. Q. 1378 (1991). The provision was ultimately dropped
in the enacted Senate bill.
126. Section 113 of the Brooks substitute set forth the application of amendments and transition rules. Overruling amendments were tied to dates of the applicable Supreme Court decisions.
Final judgments
as to which the rights of any of the parties thereto have become fixed and vested, where the
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sion, the bill applied retroactively to cases still under review. 127
Although the House passed the bill 273 to 158, supporters were unable
to secure the 290 votes necessary to ensure a veto-proof margin. 128
The effort then shifted to the Senate, where the search for a compromise position continued. Senator Danforth, a moderate Republican,
spearheaded the endeavor by introducing a version designated S.
1745 129 and served as a mediator between the Senate and the Administration. S. 1745 retained most of the key provisions from the House
bill. 130 Somewhat surprisingly, the Administration reversed itself and
embraced the new version. 131 The Act passed in the Senate on October 30 and in the House on November 8.1 32 President Bush signed the
Act into law on November 21, 1991.133
The final version of the 1991 Act itself contained no reference to
time for seeking further judicial review of such judgment has otherwise expired ••• shall be
vacated in whole or in part ifjustice requires, pursuant to rule 60{b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure or other appropriate authority, and consistent with the constitutional
requirements of due process of law.
H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 113(b)(3), reprinted in 137 CONG. REc. H3922, H3925 (daily ed.
June 5, 1991).
127. H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 113(b)(l), reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. H3922, H3925
(daily ed. June 5, 1991).
128. 137 CoNG. REc. D696 (daily ed. June 5, 1991).
129. S. 1745, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 137 CONG. REc. S15,503-12 (daily ed. Oct.
30, 1991).
130. The damage remedies and the jucy trial option remained. Compared to H.R. 1, S. 1745
makes it easier for employers to defend themselves, caps damage remedies, and leaves the meaning of business necessity andjob-relatedness under Griggs undefined.
131. The President approved ofS. 1745, promising before its passage, "I will enthusiastically
sign this bill." White House Announces Civil Rights Compromise Ending Two-Year Dispute,
DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Oct. 28, 1991, at A-20 [hereinafter White House.].
132. In addition to overruling the 1989 Supreme Court cases, the 1991 Act also overrules
two 1991 Court decisions. By overruling EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991),
Congress expanded the Act's reach to American employees working for U.S. employers overseas;
by overruling West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991), the Act allows
winning plaintiffs to recover the costs of hiring expert witnesses. The 1991 Act also extends its
reach to cover House and Senate employees. Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 301-325, 105 Stat. 1071,
1088-99 (1991) (codified at 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1224 (West Supp. 1992)). Finally, the Act establishes a glass ceiling commission to examine the barriers faced by minorities and women in attaining management and upper-level positions. Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 201-10, 105 Stat. 1081,
1081-87 (1991).
Since passage, the Senate Labor Committee has proposed overturning the damage caps for
women, disabled people, and religious minorities. The Committee has also approved a bill to
apply the Act to the Ward's Cove Packing Co., the company specifically exempted from any
potential retroactive application in the 1991 Act. Albert R. Karr, Senate Panel Votes to End Lid
on Damages, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1992, at A3, A4.
133. President Bush claimed a victory and denied that the administration had buckled under
congressional pressure: "We didn't cave. We worked out in a spirit of compromise a negotiated
settlement where I can say to the American people, 'This is not a quota bill.'" White House,
supra note 131, at A-20. Senator Kennedy praised Bush for dropping the quota issue: "The
administration retreated. They finally stopped playing the quota card." Id. Senator Wirth attributed the White House's about-face to the fallout from the Clarence Thomas confirmation
hearings and the Louisiana primacy in which David Duke, a former Klansman, mounted an
attention-getting campaign. Id. Another suggested reason for the turnabout was that Senate
Republicans who wanted the bill passed by the 1992 elections threatened to overrule Bush if a
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retroactivity and stated only that "the amendments made by this Act
shall take effect upon enactment." 134 This intentionally vague section 135 has spawned massive confusion because it fails to resolve which
cases fall under the Act's ambitious reach. 136 On November 21, 1991,
the "date of enactment," 137 hundreds of cases were headed to trial, in
the midst of trial, pending appeal, pending remand, and generally
winding their way through the system. 138 Some of the cases were
based on facts arising before 1989, and others arose during the window
of time when the Supreme Court standards were law. 139 As the next
section demonstrates, however, nothing in the legislative history or the
statutory language indicates the proper judicial response to this
dilemma.
Pursuant to the Bush administration's wishes, the Justice Department and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
have consistently opposed retroactive application of the Act. 140 Interestingly, however, the administration has not always been adamantly
showdown occurred. Joan Biskupic, Senate Passes Sweeping Measure to Overturn Court Rulings,
49 CoNG. Q. 3200, 3201 (1991).
134. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 402(a), 105 Stat. 1099 (1991). In a controversial move, Congress exempted the Wards Cove Packing Co. (the defendants in the case Congress overruled)
from the effective date provision and thus, from any future litigation. Pub. L. No. 102-166,
§ 402(b), 105 Stat. 1099 (1991).
135. See infra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
136. See cases cited supra note 8.
137. See generally President's Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 27
WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 1701-02 (Nov. 21, 1991) (announcing the signing of S. 1745).
138. It can take years for a Title VII case to get through the system. Pettway v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978), a case that began in 1965, prompted the court
to state: "The length of litigation in complex Title VII class actions often rivals that of even the
most notorious antitrust cases. In the instant case, we encounter another judicial paleolithic
museum piece." 576 F.2d at 1168.
139. The Act could be construed to cover a number of variations. Another layer of complexity arises because the "date of enactment" draws an arbitrary line among causes of action.
Clearly the Act applies to causes of action arising after November 21, 1991, but whether it applies to cases filed after the date of enactment that are based on pre-November 21 facts is unclear.
Suppose an employee is allegedly fired on the basis of race on November 20, the day before
enactment, and files a claim two months later. Which law applies, the Wards Cove test enunciated by the Supreme Court or the Griggs standard restored by the Act?
To resolve the retroactivity question, courts have three options. First, a court could apply the
Act only to cases based on facts arising after November 21. Second, a court could apply the Act
to all cases filed after November 21, regardless ·:if when the cause of action arose. Third, a court
could apply the Act to cases filed before November 21 and still pending on that day.
140. The EEOC issued a policy directive stating that the agency would only apply the Act to
cases arising after November 21, 1991. See supra note 8. The Justice Department has argued
against applying the law retroactively in cases accusing the government of discrimination against
federal employees. Robert Pear, Agency Prohibits Use of New Law in Old Bias Cases, N. Y.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 1991, at Al. The Department submitted a brief opposing retroactivity in Van
Meter v. Barr, 778 F. Supp. 83 (D.D.C. 1991) - the first official government interpretation of
the Act's effective date provision. Justice Department Brief on Issue of Retroactivity of 1991
Civil Rights Act, Ba" (No. 91-0027), cited in, Civil Rights Law Not Retroactive, DOJ Asserts,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Dec. 4, 1991, at F-1 [hereinafter Justice Dept. Brief].
The EEOC has come under attack for its position. EEOC Performance, Restrictive Stand on
1991 Act Attacked on Capital Hill, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Apr. 29, 1992, at A-3.
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opposed to retroactivity. Rather, government attorneys have argued
for retroactive application of at least six similarly ambiguous statutes,
winning millions of dollars for the government in the process. 141 In
United States v. Peppertree Apartments, 142 a housing fraud case, the
government successfully relied on Bradley in the Eleventh Circuit to
argue that the Housing and Community Development Act should apply retroactively. The government won double damages as a result.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, however, the government
rescinded its previous position favoring retroactivity so as not to jeopardize its stance on the 1991 Act. 143 With hundreds of Civil Rights
Act cases pending across the country, the government was unwilling
to defend its position and in a short brief abandoned its claim. 144 The
Court vacated the appellate court judgment. 145 Not surprisingly, civil
rights attorneys accused the government of taldng contradictory positions, "depending on whether endorsing or repudiating Bradley will
result in the preferred outcome." 146 The retroactivity issue will likely
be resolved in the context of one of the cases interpreting the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.
·
B.

The Impossible Search for Statutory Meaning

Both the Bowen and Bradley presumptions hinge on congressional
intent. In the absence of intent, Bowen presumes prospectivity, while
Bradley presumes retroactivity. 147 Thus, any court examining the
Civil Rights Act must undertake a search for intent, under which
either presumption may be rebutted. Under the traditional method of
statutory construction, courts attempt to discern the intention of the
enacting legislature by looking to the plain language of the statute, the
141. Marcus, supra note 8, at A21 (listing the following statutes: Immigration Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp. II 1990));
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103
Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (Supp. II 1990)); Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 36013617 (1988)); Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242, 101
Stat. 1815 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. (1988)); False Claims
Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified at scattered sections of 18
U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C. (1988)); Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as listed at 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1988))).
142. 942 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1991), vacated sub nom. Bailes v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
1755 (1992).
143. Linda Greenhouse, Court Avoids Decision on Time Limits of Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
28, 1992, at A17.
144. Id.
145. Bailes v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1755 (1992).
146. Marcus, supra note 8, at A21 (quoting an amicus curiae certiorari brief filed by the
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund in Bailes).
147. The Bradley test wili also consider manifest injustice resulting from its presumption of
retroactivity.

June 1992]

Note -

Civil Rights Act of 1991

2057

legislative history, and legislative purposes. 148 Recently, Justice Scalia
has revived discourse over the textual method of statutory construction, under which courts ignore legislative history and derive meaning
purely from the statute's words. 149 As this section demonstrates,
neither of these methods of interpretation aids in resolving the confusion engendered by section 402 of the Civil Rights Act. Congress simply could not decide whether to apply the Act either retroactively or
prospectively.
1. Statutory Language
"[W]here the congressional intent is clear, it governs." 150 Despite
differences in their theoretical groundings, both the traditional means
of statutory interpretation and the textualist approach look first to the
plain meaning of a statute's words to divine congressional intent. 151 A
purposely ambiguous statute like the Civil Rights Act confounds this
search for plain meaning. Judges have attacked the effective date provision of the Civil Rights Act for its vague and inconclusive language152 but have nonetheless been able to select the presumption of
their choice by finding no clear congressional intent compelling the
opposite result. Both proponents and opponents of retroactively applying the Civil Rights Act to pending cases can draw suggestive inferences from the statutory text. Ultimately, both sets of arguments fail
because they rely on finding intent, and none exists on the retroactivity
issue.
Opponents of retroactivity claim that if Congress wanted retroac148. See, e.g., Griffen v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982) ("Our task is to
give effect to the will of Congress."). Under the traditional approach, a court will first attempt to
discern legislative intent from the statute's words. The court will then look to legislative history
to give content to the language and to either confirm or rebut the implications of the plain meaning. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 31 UCLA L. REv. 621, 626 (1990).
149. A textualist interpreter looks to the statutory language and relies on the common understanding of the words, as well as a comparison of the wording with that found in similar statutes.
See e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-55 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). Textualism arises from a formalist critique which argues for restraint of the judiciary through constrained interpretive methods. Under this view, "if unelected judges exercise much discretion in
these cases [through the use of legislative history], democratic government is threatened." Eskridge, supra note 148, at 646. See generally Arthur Stock, Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources
in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160.
Several federal judges have also furthered the textualist position. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 59
(1988); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J.

371.
150. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 837 (1990).
151. Each of the two approaches finds support in Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. at 421, in which
the majority used the traditio11:tl approach while Scalia, in his concurrence, relied solely on the
text and steadfastly refused to look to legislative history. Scalia relied on the "venerable principle
that if the language of a statute is clear, that language must be given effect - at least in the
absence of a patent absurdity." 480 U.S. at 452.
152. See, e.g., King v. Shelby Medical Ctr., 779 F. Supp. 157, 158 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (calling
the problem a "tragi-comedy of confusion" and deriding Congress for avoiding the issue).
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tive application of the statute, Congress would have explicitly said
so. 153 This line of argument maintains that Congress knows how to
make its laws retroactive when it wants to. 154 However, Congress also
knows how to make its laws strictly prospective and has done so on
numerous occasions. 155 It is difficult to glean anything meaningful
from these contentions since Congress knowingly left the matter to the
courts. 156
Alternatively, proponents of retroactivity point out that the Act
specifically exempts certain provisions from retroactive treatment. 157
Section 109(c), which extends the reach of the Act overseas, states that
its provisions "shall not apply with respect to conduct occurring
before the date of ... enactment." 158 Also, section 402(b), the controversial exemption for the defendants in the Wards Cove case, specifically protects the company from retroactive application of the Act and
insulates it from any potential lawsuits. 159 Under general principles of
construction, a statute should not be construed as redundant. 160 If the
whole Act is prospective, these exemptions would be superfluous; thus,
these exemptions suggest that the rest of the Act is retroactive. In
rebuttal, opponents maintain that these provisions merely ensure that
congre8sional intent is not mistaken as to these specified parties, and
further that these sections reflect an overall antiretroactivity bias. For
instance, the Department of Justice argued that "Congress was simply
trying to assuage the Wards Cove defendants who, for whatever reason, feared that the Act would engender further litigation of their
case."161
153. See, e.g., Khandelwal v. Compuadd Corp., 780 F. Supp. 1077, 1078 (E.D. Va. 1992) ("If
Congress intended the remainder of the Act to apply retroactively, it would have stated so.").
154. See, e.g., Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544, § 6, 98 Stat.
2750, 2751 (making § 6 retroactive to 30 days before the statute's enactment); Longshore and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-426, § 28, 98 Stat.
1639, 1655 (the amendments of the act apply to claims pending on the date of enactment).
155. See, e.g., Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 310, 104 Stat. 5089,
5114 (1990) ("The amendments made by this section shall apply to civil actions commenced on
or after the date of the enactment of this Act."); Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-555, § 2(b), 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (containing a postponed effective date for existing fringe
benefit and insurance programs).
156. "It will be up to the courts to determine the extent to which the bill will apply to cases
and claims that are pending on the date of enactment." 137 CoNG. REc. Sl5,485 (daily ed. Oct.
30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
157. See e.g., Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302, 1304 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
158. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(c), 105 Stat. 1071, 1078 (1991).
159. This section states, "Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, nothing in this
act shall apply to any disparate impact case for which a complaint was filed before March 1,
1975, and for which an initial decision was rendered after October 30, 1983." Pub. L. No. 102166, § 402(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1099 (1991). The Senate Labor Committee has since approved
legislation to overturn this provision and thereby make the Act available to Wards Cove Packing
Co. employees. See supra note 132.
160. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988).
161. See Justice Dept. Brief, supra note 140, at 11.
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Yet another analysis compares the ambiguous language of Section
402 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act with the deleted explicit retroactivity
provisions of the 1990 version. On the one hand, the deletion signals

that Congress disapproved of retroactive application of the Act to
pending cases. On the other hand, that Congress failed to expressly
deny retroactivity implies that it sanctioned retroactivity in certain
instances.
As becomes clear, the problem with these strategic textual arguments is that both sides have valid contentions. The textual clues
prove little. Congress not only lacked unanimous intent but very simply did not know what it wanted. There is no intent to be found other than the intent to leave the problem to the courts.
2.

Legislative History

Congress knew that the Act's application to pending cases remained unresolved. In fact, senators and representatives went to great
lengths to put their own spin on the matter into the legislative history.
In the House, Representative Edwards stated that "[t]he intent of the
sponsors is that this language be given its normal effect, and that the
provisions of the bill be applied to pending cases." 162 In the Senate,
Senators Dole and Danforth supported the administration's position
and each submitted a memorandum of law into the Congressional Record arguing against retroactivity. 163 Senator Kennedy, however, responded to these memoranda by asserting that he only agreed to be a
cosponsor of the bill with the understanding that "[i]t will be up to the
courts to determine the extent to which the bill will apply to cases and
claims that are pending on the date of enactment." 164 Kennedy characterized the bill as a "restoration of a prior rule," and cited cases
which applied restored rules retroactively. 165 As a result of these contrary pronouncements, federal courts may support either view after an
obligatory search through the legislative history.166
President Bush also attempted to inject his own voice into the legislative history. In his presidential signing statement, Bush said that
Dole's interpretive memorandum covers all technical matters, such as
the effective date, and "will be treated as authoritative interpretive guidance by all officials in the executive branch." 167 His endorsement of
the Dole view does not add to the legislative history, but it may swing
162. 137 CoNG. REc. H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
163. 137 CoNG. REc. S15,483, S15,485 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (interpretive memorandum
submitted by Sen. Danforth); see also 137 CoNG. REc. S15,472, S15,478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991)
(interpretive memorandum submitted by Sen. Dole).
164. 137 CoNG. REc. S15,485 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
165. Id.
166. The federal courts have largely used these statements merely to point out that the issue
is unclear. See infra section 11.C.
167. President's Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, supra note 137, at 1702.
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the balance for courts fed up with the congressional confusion. 168
In the end, the only clear meaning which comes out of the enactment provision is that Congress could not come to a consensus. The
"declarations and counter-declarations" 169 in the legislative history
fail to guide courts convincingly in either direction. Whether a court
construes statutes by looking at "plain meaning" or by relying on extrinsic aids such as legislative history, the application of the Act to
pending cases remains ambiguous. Thus, attempts to divine meaning
from these weak inferences will avoid the underlying and most meaningful issue: why should or should not the Act be applied
retroactively?
C.

Cases Interpreting the Civil Rights Act

The first federal appellate court to address the retroactivity issue
declined to apply the Act to pending cases. In Vogel v. City of Cincinnatl 170 a split Sixth Circuit panel stated that "[w]e ... shall not attempt to interpret the substantive provisions of the 1991 Act; rather
we shall apply the law that was in effect prior to the 1991 Act." 171 In
Vogel, the court affirmed summary judgment against a white male who
brought a reverse discrimination suit against the Cincinnati police department. The plaintiff claimed that the department's affirmative action policy, enacted pursuant to a consent decree negotiated between
the police and the Department of Justice, discriminated against him in
favor of minority and women candidates. 172 Although the plaintiff
eventually joined a later recruit class, he sued for back pay, retroactive
seniority, and other benefits. 173 The court felt it had to address the
retroactivity question as a "preliminary matter."174
In reaching its decision, the court first acknowledged that retroactivity was an open question and briefly recited the applicable case law
of Bradley, Bowen, and Bonjorno. 175 The Court found that the language and legislative history of the Act were unclear and that, as a
result, district courts were divided on the issue. 176 The court chose to
168. Most commentators do not believe that Presidential Signing Statements should piny a
role in judicial decisionmaking, and traditionally they have had no role. See generally Marc N.
Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as Interpretations of Legislatfre In·
tent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363 (1987); William D.
Popkin, Judicial Use ofPresidential Legislative History: A Critique, 66 IND. L.J. 699 (1991); Brad
Waites, Note, Let Me Tell You What You Mean: An Analysis ofPresidential Signing Statements,
21 GA. L. REV. 755 (1987).
169. Van Meter v. Barr, 778 F. Supp. 83, 84 (D.D.C. 1991).
170. 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992).
171. 959 F.2d at 597.
172. See 959 F.2d at 596.
173. See 959 F.2d at 597.
174. 959 F.2d at 597.
175. See 959 F.2d at 597.
176. See 959 F.2d at 598.
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follow the EEOC policy statement in which the Commission decided it
would not seek damages under the Act for events occurring before
November 21, 1991. 177 The court stated that an agency's construction
of a statute it administers is entitled to deference and that the EEOC's
decision "appears reasonable." 178
The court also reasoned that prospective application of the Act
was consistent with a recent Sixth Circuit case which had applied
Bowen. 17 9 The court recognized that the Circuit had often cited Bradley as the controlling provision, but stated that Bradley should be narrowly construed and not applied in contexts where " 'substantive
rights and liabilities' ... would be affected." 180 Without any explanation, the court announced that "clearly, retroactive application of the
1991 Act would affect 'substantive rights and liabilities' of the parties
to this action." 181 The court then applied pre-1991 law and determined that Vogel lacked standing to enforce the consent decree collaterally.182 The concurring judge declined to join the holding on the
retroactivity of the Act because the issue had not been raised, briefed,
or argued by the parties. 183 Whether application of the 1991 Act
would have changed the court's ultimate resolution of the issue, or
even why the court felt compelled to address the retroactivity question, remains unclear. Regardless, the court's reasoning fails to justify
its conclusion.
Several courts dealing with retroactive application of ambiguous
statutes have grasped onto a substance/procedure distinction. 184 The
Vogel court's assertion that "substantive rights and liabilities" would
177. See 959 F.2d at 598.
178. 959 F.2d at 598. Few courts have relied so heavily on the EEOC directive. See, e.g.,
Sofferin v. American Airlines, 785 F. Supp. 780, 785 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Thompson v. Johnson &
Johnson Management Info. Ctr., 783 F. Supp. 893, 897 (D.N.J. 1992) (both citing the EEOC
guideline as support, but not relying on it exclusively). Many courts have not addressed the
EEOC guideline at all, most likely because it addresses only the government's position on applying the new damage provisions to pending claims, and not the entire Act. Civil Rights Amendments Aren't Retroactive, EEOC Says. 60 U.S.L.W. 2418, 2418 (1992). Furthermore, the EEOC
chose to follow Bowen without any justification other than the fact that it is the Court's more
recent holding. However, this argument is not persuasive because in Bonjorno, a case decided
after Bowen, the Court acknowledged the validity of both Bradley and Bowen. See supra notes
47-49 and accompanying text. The EEOC conceded that "it could also be argued that, in light of
the public concerns inherent to Civil Rights Act litigation, requiring employers to pay unforseen
damages for unlawful discrimination is not manifestly unjust." EEOC Declares 1991 Civil Rights
Act Does Not Apply to Pre-Act Conduct, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Jan. 2, 1992, at A-8.
179. See 959 F.2d at 598.
180. 959 F.2d at 598.
181. 959 F.2d at 598.
182. See 959 F.2d at 598.
183. See 959 F.2d at 601 (Ryan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184. For cases outside the context of the Civil Rights Act see, for example, FDIC v. 232,
Inc., 920 F.2d 815 (11th Cir. 1991) (applying a statute retroactively because it affects purely
procedural rights); Birnholz v. 44 Wall St. Fund., Inc., 880 F.2d 335 (11th Cir. 1989) (same);
Kruso v. ITI Corp., 872 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1989) (same).
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be affected by application of the Civil Rights Act reflects this approach. These courts have seized on some language in the Supreme
Court's retroactivity opinions to infer a substance/procedure distinction, 185 under which substantive changes in the law are applied prospectively while procedural or remedial changes are applied
retroactively. The courts may be using this distinction as a shorthand
way of balancing the potential dangers of retroactivity, tying these
dangers to substantive laws while minimizing them for procedural
laws.
However, this approach suffers from shortcomings. No consensus
has emerged on what comprises substance or procedure, revealing the
lack of content in the distinction. 186 For instance, in characterizing
provisions of the Civil Rights Act, one court stated, "[t]here can be no
dispute that a right to seek compensatory damages in a jury trial is a
major substantive provision," 187 while another court stated, "compensatory damages and jury trial, are not substantive rights . . . these
rights are remedies and procedural rights." 188 The lack of content to
the distinction leaves courts without adequate guidance on how to
characterize a particular interest and allows policy preferences to determine outcomes. Consequently, similar cases end up with opposite
results, making the entire doctrine unpredictable. Courts must grope
to distinguish between objectionable and acceptable effects of retroactivity. The substance/procedure distinction blurs the analysis. 189
The Eighth Circuit also applied the law prospectively in Fray v.
Omaha World Herald Co. 190 but under different reasoning than the
court in Vogel In 1987, the plaintiff brought suit alleging that the
defendant discriminated against her on the basis of race and sex between 1984 and 1986. While the case was awaiting trial, the Supreme
Court decided Patterson v. McLean Credit Union. 191 Under that deci185. Bradley states that it will not apply a statute retroactively where "to do so would infringe upon or deprive a person of a right that had matured or become unconditional." Bradley
v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 720 (1974). In another case, Bennett v. New Jersey, the Court held
that a determination of whether funds from a federal grant program were misused should be
made under standards of law that existed at the time. Distinguishing Bradley, the Court noted
the presumption for prospectivity, "that statutes affecting substantive rights and liabilities are
presumed to have only prospective effect." 470 U.S. 632, 639 (1985).
186. In Bonjorno, Scalia particularly disdained drawing the line in this manner:
I suppose it would be possible to distinguish between statutes that alter "substantive rights
and liabilities" directly, and those that do so only by retroactively adding a procedural re·
quirement, the failure to comply with which alters the "substantive rights and liabilities" but I fail to see the sense in such a distinction.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Co. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 853 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
187. Khandelwal v. Compuadd Corp., 780 F. Supp. 1077, 1080 n.5 (E.D. Va. 1992).
188. United States v. Department of Mental Health, 785 F. Supp. 846, 853 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
189. See infra Part III. This Note's proposed framework allows courts to address their valid
concerns while avoiding the use of artificial labels.
190. 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992).
191. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
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sion, section 1981 claims only apply to the making and enforcement of
contracts, and not to later employment practices. 192 Relying on Patterson, the defendant moved for summary judgment. The district
court denied the motion and the section 1981 claim was tried before a
jury, which awarded the plaintiff damages. The case was pending appeal when the 1991 Act took effect. After a lengthy analysis of Bradley and Bowen, and an acknowledgement that the effective date
provision is unclear, the appellate court nonetheless avoided choosing
between the presumptions by finding evidence of congressional intent
to apply the law prospectively. 193 The court found it dispositive of
legislative intent that the 1991 Act eliminated the explicit retroactive
provisions of the vetoed 1990 bill.194
The dissenting judge attacked the finding of a clear congressional
directive, stating that the elimination of the 1990 Act's explicit retroactivity provision "is dispositive merely of Congress'[ ] intent to leave
the retroactivity decision to the courts." 195 Rather than choosing between the presumptions, the dissent felt that the court should reconcile the presumptions as much as possible. 196 Bradley and Bowen
share a common thread, the dissent argued, because both are based on
an overriding concern for fairness. 197 Thus, the dissent engaged in a
fairness analysis which stressed that all the alleged discriminatory conduct occurred before the Court's 1989 decision: "Until the Supreme
Court decided Patterson in 1989, there was every indication that the
conduct that formed the basis of [the employee's] complaint was actionable under section 1981." 198 The defendant had continual notice
that section 1981 could apply to its conduct, and thus the 1991 Act
simply restored the rights of the parties as they stood when the lawsuit
began. 199 Even the majority conceded, "In these circumstances, retroactive application of [section] 101 to this pending case would neither
alter the rights and expectations of the parties nor disturb previously
vested rights." 200
As the Vogel court noted, the district courts are split on the retro192. 491 U.S. at 171.
193. "Therefore, whether we apply the traditional [Bowen] principle of presumptive nonretroactivity, which we think is the better rule, or the conflicting Bradley test, we conclude that
§ 101 of the Act, overruling Patterson, should not be retroactively applied to pending cases or
other pre-enactment conduct." 960 F.2d at 1378.
194. See 960 F.2d at 1377.
195. 960 F.2d at 1379 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
196. See 960 F.2d at 1380 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
197. See 960 F.2d at 1381 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
198. 960 F.2d at 1381-82 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
199. See 960 F.2d at 1382 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
200. 960 F.2d at 1378.
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activity issue.201 Mojica v. Gannett Co. 202 and Khandelwhal v. Compuadd Corp., 203 typify the district courts' divergent views. As these
representative cases demonstrate, the district courts have generally
been scrupulous in examining the statute's language and legislative
history, as well as in citing the conflicting precedents of Bradley,
Bowen, and Bonjorno. Yet, when it comes to selecting a presumption,
courts generaij.y fall back on either following their circuit's retroactivity precedent204 or simply choosing what seems the "better rule." 205
As a result, the current case law lacks any sort of uniformity or certainty, while putting litigants at the mercy of individual federal court
policy preferences. Applying the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in this arbi201. See supra note 8. The cases have arisen on motions to amend by plaintiffs and on summary judgment motions by defendants.
202. 779 F. Supp. 94 (N.D.
1991). Mojica was the first district court case to hold that the
Act applied retroactively. In that case, a Hispanic female disc jockey sued her employer for
violations of Title VII based on sex and national origin. The plaintiff had originally filed suit in
1990, and later amended her complaint in light of the Civil Rights Act, adding requests for
compensatory and punitive damages and a jury trial.
The court addressed the inconclusive legislative history and the inconsistent precedents on
retroactivity and decided to follow a prior Seventh Circuit opinion which applied Bradley by
finding that no prejudice would result. The circuit court opinion reasoned that "[a]ny tension
between the two lines of precedent is negated because, under Bradley, a statute will not be
deemed to apply retroactively if it would threaten manifest injustice by disrupting vested rights."
779 F. Supp. at 96-97 (quoting FDIC v. Wright, 942 F.2d 1089, 1095 n.6 (7th Cir. 1991)).
The court then looked for any congressional intent to rebut the presumption ofretroactivity.
The court cited the Restoration Act cases and found that when Congress overrules Court "inter·
pretations of an existing statute [there is] some support for applying the new amendments retroactively." 779 F. Supp. at 97. Although this factor was not conclusive, it provided evidence that
Congress did not intend purely prospective application. 779 F. Supp. at 97. The Wards Co~·e
exception was additional evidence against concluding that the statute is to be applied prospec·
tively. 779 F. Supp. at 97. On the basis of these inferences, along with the inconclusive language
and legislative history, the court determined that the presumption of retroactivity remained. 779
F. Supp. at 97-98. The court then addressed the three manifest injustice factors of Bradley and
found that no injustice would result from applying the Act retroactively. 779 F. Supp. at 98-99.
203. 780 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. Va. 1992). The court in Khandelwal found that the Act ap·
plied prospectively. The plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, alleging that he had been
discriminatorily discharged on the basis of national origin in violation of Title VII. After enact·
ment of the 1991 Act, he sought leave of the court to amend his original complaint in order to
include the newly available remedies. In denying the plaintiff's motion to amend, the court
stated, "[i]t is obvious that no provision of the new Act conveys a clear indication that Congress
intended the Act to apply retroactively." 780 F. Supp. at 1078. The court rejected the plaintiff's
claim that the Wards Cove and foreign corporation exemptions from retroactivity would be
meaningless ifthe Act were to be applied prospectively. 780 F. Supp. at 1079. Instead, the court
said that if Congress wanted to intend retroactivity it would have clearly indicated that purpose.
780 F. Supp. at 1078. Finding the legislative history and precedent anything but clear, the court
chose to follow Bowen because it is "the better rule." 780 F. Supp. 1081. The court stated that
the Bowen rule best preserved the division between courts and legislatures, that it was a more
recent decision and thus more accurately reflected current Court sentiment, and that over 180
years of precedent supported it. See 780 F. Supp. at 1081. Compelled by "plain logic" and
persuasive case authority, the Court applied the Act prospectively. See 780 F. Supp. 1082.
204. See, e.g., Conerly v. CVN Cos., 785 F. Supp. 801, 804-05 (D. Minn. 1992); Cook v.
Foster Forbes Glass, 783 F. Supp. 1217, 1221 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (both following Eighth Circuit's
choice of Bowen as the better rule in Simmons v. Lockhart, 931F.2d1226, 1230 (8th Cir. 1991)).
205. See Khandelwal v. Compuadd Corp., 780 F. Supp. 1077, 1082 (E.D. Va. 1992) (choos·
ing Bowen).

m.

June 1992]

Note -

2065

Civil Rights Act of 1991

trary and patchwork manner undermines the federal statutory mandate for a national antidiscrimination policy.
III.

A

FRAMEWORK FOR REsOLVING RETROACTIVITY
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991

ISSUES

IN

This Part proposes a framework for courts to use in determining
whether the Civil Rights Act should apply to pending cases. In order
to discern the law in the absence of specific congressional directives,
courts need a principled basis for making retroactivity decisions,
rather than contradictory canons of construction. A principled approach recognizes the legitimate dangers of retroactivity but acknowledges that these dangers are not always present. Such an approach
also captures the norms favored by principled decisionmaking - those
of efficiency and fairness.
Section III.A argues that the federal courts have the authority to
fill in the gaps left by the Civil Rights Act and therefore do not need to
demand clear statements from Congress. Section III.B proposes a
principled approach to resolving indeterminate questions of retroactive application. This approach requires courts to assess the effects of
retroactivity inherent in a specified statutory scheme. Section III.C
then analyzes the Civil Rights Act according to this framework and
concludes that because the Civil Rights Act does not implicate any
dangers of retroactivity, the Act should apply to cases pending on the
date of the statute's enactment.
A. Judicial Authority To Fill in Statutory Gaps
On the issue of the Civil Rights Act's retroactive applicability,
Congress clearly and knowingly left a gap in the statute. 206 As part of
the hurried compromise process, Congress left many issues unresolved
and in so doing delegated decisionmaking authority to the courts. 207
This is a common legislative result because "[a]ll statutes are compromises, and the cornerstone of many a compromise is the decision,
usually unexpressed, to leave certain issues unresolved." 208 Courts
often act as gap fillers by giving meaning to ambiguous provisions. In
206. "Congress deliberately and expressly failed to agree on the question. . . . Therefore,
Congress left the issue to be determined by the federal courts, each side believing and hoping that
their respective views on the applicable presumption would prevail." United States. v. Department of Mental Health, 785 F. Supp. 846, 850 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (applying the Act retroactively).
"If anything, the legislative history of the Act shows merely that Congress decided not to decide." Cook v. Foster Forbes Glass, 783 F. Supp. 1217, 1219 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (applying the Act
prospectively).
207. "As a political compromise necessary to the enactment of the 1991 Act Congress simply
left this [retroactivity] matter for the courts to determine." Department ofMental Health, 785 F.
Supp. at 851. Many other provisions were ambiguous and thus implicitly left for the courts to
resolve, the most controversial being the definition of business necessity in § 105, the provision
intended to overrule Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
208. Easterbrook, supra note 105, at 540.
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fact, as statutes have become an integral part of this country's regulatory scheme, courts have grown increasingly enmeshed in the interpretation and resolution of statutory gaps. 2 09
The clear statement rule for retroactivity, beyond being unjustifiable on constitutional due process grounds, 210 fails to recognize inherent limits in legislative reality and demands that Congress reach an
accord which may be impossible. Although it would be preferable for
Congress to clearly state each and every one of its intentions, the institutional limits on Congress prevent legislators from writing statutes
with the meticulous specificity that would eliminate ambiguities. 211
Many statutory gaps are unconscious and result from congressional
neglect, ambiguous language,212 or unforeseen consequences. In contrast, the gap left by the Civil Rights Act results from a conscious
decision by Congress to duck the issue and thereby leave resolution to
the federal courts.213 Congress knew that its silence would force the
issue to the judiciary. 214 Legislators' numerous attempts to get their
views in the legislative history reveal that Congress knew the courts
would eventually deal with the issue.
Congress' delegation makes sense because retroactivity is a courtcreated doctrine, developed through cases such as Bradley and
Bowen. 215 The incremental development of the common law has provided conflicting presumptions on retroactive application of ambiguous statutes.216 In general, presumptions should embody background
209. See EsKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 13, at 569.
210. See supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
211. See EsKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 13, at 569.
212. "[U]nlike mathematical symbols, the phrasing of a document, especially a complicated
enactment, seldom attains more than approximate precision." Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading ofStatutes, 41 CoLUM. L. REV. 527, 528 (1947). "[T]here is a limit, inherent in the nature of language, to the guidance which general language can provide." H.L.A.
HART, THE CoNCEPT OF LAW 123 (1961).
213. Courts regularly make decisions through the development of the federal common law.
"From the outset, our system has recognized a role for federal common law, and only the scope
of that role has been open to question." Martha A. Field, Sources ofLaw: The Scope ofFederal
Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 907 (1986). For further commentary on the scope of the
federal common law, see Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE
L. REV. (forthcoming 1992), and Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal
Courts, 52 u. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985).
The strongest case for the federal courts to develop common law occurs when "Congress has
given the courts power to develop substantive law." Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials,
Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981); see also Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957) (establishing the principle that Congress can delegate lawmaking power to the federal
courts). According to Merrill, a delegation ofjudicial lawmaking "takes place when Congress or
the framers of the Constitution have conferred power on the federal courts to fashion federal
rules of decision in order to round out or complete a Constitutional or statutory scheme." Merrill, supra, at 40. Under this theory, courts would be rounding out provisions of the Civil Rights
Act pursuant to a congressional delegation.
214. See supra section 11.B.
215. See supra section I.A.
216. See supra section I.A.
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assumptions against which lawmakers operate.217 To rebut these assumptions and break with the status quo, legislators must provide explicit directives.
In the Civil Rights Act, however, Congress knew that two contradictory background assumptions operated in the face of congressional
silence. Some representatives and senators urged courts to invoke
Bradley, 218 while others hoped that Bowen would be the operative presumption.219 There is a background assumption neither of retroactivity nor prospectivity, and thus both presumptions have lost their
effectiveness as interpretive tools. Neither side in the retroactivity debate could gamer enough votes to prevail, yet the presumptions allow
a particular view to win merely by default. By providing lawmakers
with conflicting signals, courts must defer to Congress' wishes and unravel the doctrine. Rather than applying the existing presumptions,
courts should give content to the ambiguous provision by using the
proposed analysis.
Courts regularly accept gap-filling responsibilities in the face of silence resulting from congressional oversight. This gap-filling role becomes even more compelling when Congress has consciously delegated
the decisionmaking authority to the courts. Interpretation of ambiguous statutes does not entail unwarranted judicial discretion. Rather,
in an "age of statutes,"220 courts regularly settle statutory ambiguities
by filling in gaps inevitably left by the legislature. The Supreme Court
has acknowledged the judicial role in filling statutory gaps: "We often
must legislate interstitially to iron out inconsistencies within a statute
or to fill gaps resulting from legislative oversight or to resolve ambiguities resulting from a legislative compromise."221 Judges should be able
to "fill[] the open spaces in the law" 222 and make a "fresh choice between open altematives."223
The need for judicial resolution of statutes recurs time and again.
Almost all complex modem day statutes contain ambiguous provi217. William V. Luneburg, Retroactive and Administrative Rulemaking, 1991 DUKE L.J.
106, 136.
218. See supra note 162 (statement of Rep. Edwards).
219. See supra note 163 (statements of Senators Danforth and Dole).
220. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
221. U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 354 (1971) (footnote omitted); see
also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 14 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("When the language does
not reflect what history reveals to have been the true legislative intent, we have readily construed
the Civil Rights Acts to include words that Congress inadvertently omitted."); Cass v. United
States, 417 U.S. 72, 83 (1974) ("In resolving ambiguity, we must allow ourselves some recognition of the existence of sheer inadvertence in the legislative process." (quoting Schmid v. United
States, 436 F.2d 987, 992 (Ct. Cl. 1971)); cf Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221
(1917) (Holmes, J. dissenting) ("[J]udges do and must legislate, but they can do so only
interstitially").
222. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921).
223. HART, supra note 212, at 125.

2068

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 90:2035

sions that the judiciary must eventually resolve. Statutes as varied as
RIC0, 224 section 1983,225 the Sherman Act, 226 and Title VII227 demand judicial intervention and expertise to resolve the definition of
terms, burdens and methods of proof, possible defenses, and other unsettled issues. Courts have not declined to resolve these open questions by sending these issues back to Congress and thereby curtailing
the interpretive process. Instead, they have used their decisionmaking
authority to give content to these statutes.228
Like most statutory interpretation cases, the decisions overruled by
the Act resulted from the Court's gap-filling role. The Supreme Court
did not demand clear statements when assessing Title VII, the law
amended by the Act. Rather, the court interpreted, analyzed, and resolved tough statutory questions under its judicial authority. 229 As
Professor Sunstein notes, "[m]uch of the law of Title VII is an unavoidable, and legitimate, norm-ridden exercise in developing gap-filling rules." 230 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 demands no less. By
relying on a clear-statement rule, the judiciary may adversely affect
the development of the law: "[I]n a system of law whose moral
growth over time is grounded on the concept of reasoned elaboration,
the failure of articulation presages moral stagnation of the law."231 A
court should not decline to exercise judicial discretion in interpreting
the Civil Rights Act, as the statute is meant to overturn the Title VII
interpretations of an activist Court.232
B. An Approach for Resolving Retroactivity Dilemmas

This section proposes a solution to the retroactivity dilemma. The
proposed approach does not select either of the presumptions as determinative. The weaknesses of the clear-statement rule expressed in
Bowen have already been exposed. 233 Several courts have seized on
the Bradley rule because it does not mandate a result and allows a
court to employ the "manifest injustice" test to alleviate fairness concerns. However, each presumption relies on a legal fiction to attribute
to legislators an intent they do not have, a fiction dramatically illustrated by the Civil Rights Act. The Supreme Court never illuminated
224. 18 u.s.c. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
225. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1988).
226. IS U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
227. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
228. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 1.
229. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 1.
230. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405,
422 (1989).
231. Note, supra note 19, at 905.
232. See generally Symposium, The United States Supreme Court's 1988 Term Civil Rights
Cases, 64 TuL. L. REv. 1341 (1990).
233. See supra section I.C.
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any method of deciding between the presumptions, most likely because
no rational dividing line exists. Moreover, the Court variably applied
the presumptions without justification, and the lack of legal reasoning
has left lower courts adrift.
A preferable analysis would approach the Civil Rights Act without
any false and preconceived notions about legislative intent. Instead of
providing a presumption, this approach requires courts to make a reasoned judgment. Under this Note's proposed framework, a court must
determine whether applying the statute at issue to a given case implicates any of the dangers of retroactivity: unsettling expectations, depriving parties of notice, or targeting vulnerable groups. 234 If these
concerns arise, a court should decline to apply a statute to pending
cases. If these concerns fail to materialize, a court should apply the
law to pending cases.
The predictable effects of this approach are that statutes regulating
new areas will usually be applied prospectively, while statutes which
overrule court decisions are more likely to be applied retroactively.
This schism results because statutes regulating new areas may carry
with them more of the potential dangers of retroactivity than a statute
like the Civil Rights Act, which restores expectations. Accordingly, in
their deliberations over the Restoration Act, the federal courts recognized that restorative statutes were less likely to raise serious retroactivity concerns.235
This proposal is not a radical restructuring of retroactivity precedent. It recognizes the legitimate dangers of retroactivity addressed by
Bowen, while concurrently allowing the deliberative approach of Bradley. This method simply eliminates the irreconcilable conflict between
Bradley and Bowen by allowing courts to reach the heart of the retroactivity debate. In other words, rather than engaging in a useless debate over which presumption to apply, courts focus on actual
objections to retroactivity and whether these objections inhere in a
particular statute. This inquiry will lead to. well-reasoned and inherently more just opinions. 23 6
C.

The Civil Rights Act in Action

This section analyzes the 1991 Civil Rights Act according to the
proposed framework. This analysis reveals not only that the risks of
retroactive lawmaking are absent in the Civil Rights Act, but also that
retroactive application of the Act promotes the dual goals of efficiency
and fairness.
234. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
235. See supra section I.B.
236. Courts will not necessarily agree in their conclusions, but the decisions will be betterreasoned as judges confront the real issues implicated by retroactive statutes.
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The Civil Rights Act Does Not Implicate the Dangers of
Retroactivity

a. The Act restores expectations. By attaching new consequences
to past acts, retroactivity can upset reliance interests. 237 However, our
system does not insulate all reliance interests since "the legal order
must constantly change to fit new factual conditions or new conceptions of the common good." 238 Both judicial decisionmaking and prospective lawmaking also inevitably alter expectations. Yet the
American legal system does not protect all interests from change, because to do so would freeze the law forever. 239 Thus, where the impact of a retroactive law ranges no further than that accepted for
prospective laws or judicial decisions, the law fits within the reasonable limits of our system.
Prospective laws can alter preexisting legal relations by creating
new rights and duties. Even purely prospective application of the
Civil Rights Act will require employers to conform their actions to its
mandates. 240 This may require a restructuring of hiring, firing, and
promotion practices, along with other workplace norms. Yet this disruption is rightly accepted as necessary to effectuate national policy.
One commentator has noted the disparity in treatment between retroactive and prospective laws: "The guardians of expectations can
neither locate the dividing line nor satisfactorily explain why only
those expectations under attack from the retroactive side are deserving
of protection."241 The degree of the disruption, not whether the disruption comes from a retroactive law, should be the determinative
factor.
237. "To say that one has relied on a law is to say that, at some previous moment or moments, one made choices on the basis of that law." W. David Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CAL. L. R.Ev. 216, 225 (1960).
238. Id. at 226.
239. FULLER, supra note 103, at 60.
240. It could be argued that prospective laws do not make a person legally liable for actions
without notice. However, economic legislation such as a new tax law can have vast consequences
on prior investments, in essence "punishing" the person who made decisions based on past
standards:
Consider the following: I purchase a house in 1980, carefully considering how much I can
afford in monthly payments and choosing a house that my budget can tolerate. My calculations are premised on the continued availability of tax deductions for both my mortgage
interest payments and my property taxes. In 1986, a tax reform package is enacted under
which these deductions will no longer be available. Certainly, most of us would not regard
such legislation as retroactive, notwithstanding its effect on my past transaction. If, however, the tax reform requires me to file amended returns dating back to 1983 and to pay
taxes on previously deducted interest, most of us would concur in the judgment that this was
retroactive legislation. can this dichotomy be rationalized?
Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity,
1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 435 (footnotes omitted).
241. Id. at 441. But see Justice Scalia's concurrence in Bonjorno: "The principle that the
legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct
took place has timeless and universal human appeal." Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Co. v.
Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990).
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Furthermore, retroactivity is the norm in judicial decisionmaking,
where court decisions regularly apply to past, completed acts. The
assumption that judicial decisions apply retroactively arises from a
conception that courts simply find preexisting law in analyzing statutes - because the law always existed, there is no retroactivity involved in applying the law to past actions. 242 This conception has
been largely discredited; 243 in fact, most of the academic discourse on
judicial retroactivity has focused on finding exceptions to judicial retroactivity through prospective decisionmaking. 244 Thus, the same objections aimed at retroactive statutes can also to varying degrees be
leveled at judicial retroactivity. The "individual who is affected by
judge-made law has no notice of what is coming and suffers without
redress. " 245
When Congress restores the unsettling effects of unexpected judicial decisions, it provides stability and continuity to the law, while engaging in a valuable dialogue with the judiciary.
Judicial rule-making does include a retroactive element analogous to
that present in legislation when th~ effect of a decision is to overrule past
decisions or widely accepted lay or administrative interpretations of the
law. The overruled interpretations provide a status quo upon which reliance may have been based. The unsettling effect can be quite pronounced in those relatively infrequent cases in which the court's decision
is almost totally unexpected. In these situations, retroactive legislation
designed to restore the status quo may be appropriate. 246

Finding the line between reasonable and unreasonable disruption of
expectation interests ultimately turns on Congress' judgment. After
factfinding, analysis, and considerable deliberation, Congress determined that amendments to Title VII were necessary to restore prior
understandings of the statute. As long as Congress' determination
that the Act restores interests has a rational basis, courts should defer
to Congress. Despite many ambiguities in the Civil Rights Act, 247 the
242. See Roger J. Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial Responsibility, 28 HAsnNGs L.J. 533, 534-35 (1977).
243. "The insistence that judges could simply find the true and timeless rule, uninfluenced by
evolving moral values and social policies, now seems anachronistic." See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104
HARV. L. REv. 1731, 1759 (1991). Courts may apply a decision prospectively ifthere was substantial reliance on the overruled decision, if the purposes can be effectuated without retroactive
application, or if retroactivity would burden the administration of justice. Annotation, Prospective or Retroactive Operation of Overruling Decision, 10 A.L.R. 3d 1371, 1384 (1966).
244. These commentators argue that in certain circumstances the Court should apply its
decisions prospectively. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 243; Traynor, supra note 242; Note,
Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907
(1962).
245. Smith, supra note 100, at 419.
246. Slawson, supra note 237, at 245.
247. The application of the Act to pending cases is only one of many controversial issues
arising out of ambiguous provisions in the Act. See Ambiguities in Civil Rights Law Still Must be
Resolved by Courts, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Dec. 11, 1991, at C-1.
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overriding purpose of the law is clear. Congress minces no words in
noting that the Act will "respond to recent decisions of the Supreme
Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes." 248
Congress specifically attacks the Wards Cove decision by stating that it
"weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections"249 and that as a result additional legislation is necessary to protect against discrimination. The Act is thus a direct rebuff of Supreme
Court interpretations.
Like most broadly written statutes, Title VII lends itself to divergent interpretations. Its ambiguities suggest that courts will rarely
agree on the interpretation of a given provision or that Congress, if
Congress can even be said to possess a single intent, will always feel
that courts are getting it exactly right. However, Congress has the last
word on the interpretation of its statutes, and its overruling of statutory decisions serves as a check on the courts. 250 Accordingly, Congress' perception of court interpretations should accordingly be given
considerable weight. Although the controversial Court decisions fell
on the possible spectrum of interpretations, they generally fell on an
extreme end. Even the conservative opponents of the Civil Rights Act
proposed an alternative bill which would have overruled two of the
more unexpected Court decisions. 251 Given a choice between reading
the provisions expansively or narrowly, the Court generally took the
more restrictive view. 252 As in all problems of interpretation, the
Court had choices, and it exercised its legitimate authority by choosing options which generally aided defendants. In Congress' judgment,
these choices strayed too far afield from the underlying spirit of Title
VII.
In overruling the 1989 decisions, Congress restored the values and
understandings developed over twenty-five years of federal court interpretations. These long-standing expectation interests and their subsequent reaffirmance by Congress outweigh the interests which arose
during the two-year break from the past. Essentially a windfall gain
248. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991). See

supra note 122.
249. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991). See

supra note 122.
250. Judicial review and congressional overruling are, in the normal course of events, constructive measures to correct the inevitable goofs both branches commit. • • • In these circumstances, the natural process of checks and balances provides a quick injection to cure
the malady: Congress passes a law to state what it means more precisely.
Mikva & Bleich, supra note 12, at 731.
251. In 1990, the Administration proposed a bill which would have overruled Patterson and
Lorance. S. 2166, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (Senate version); H.R. 4081, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990) (House version).
252. "Each decision created practical difficulties for plaintiffs seeking relief for workplace
discrimination under either title VII or section 1981." William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on
History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 614
(1991).

June 1992]

Note -

Civil Rights Act of 1991

2073

for employers, those decisions disrupted expectations to a far greater
degree than the restorative Civil Rights Act. The Act does not unsettle expectations to a degree above and beyond that tolerated in a dynamic system of laws.
The Court's opinion in Wards Cove made it extremely difficult for
employees to press and prevail on a disparate impact claim. In explaining its reasoning, the Court admitted that "some of our earlier
decisions can be read as suggesting [the law was] otherwise" but that
such a reading was in error. 253 One commentator observed wryly, "of
course the 'error' had been committed by Congress, both plaintiffs'
and defendants' Title VII attorneys, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, every lower federal court, and the leading commentators. " 254 In the continuing dialogue between the Court and
Congress, retroactivity can restore "settled" expeptations by diminishing the effect of Court decisions which stray too far from statutory
purposes.
b. Retroactive application of the Act does not deprive parties of
notice. Employers may claim that without notice of the change in
Supreme Court doctrine, they were unable to plan their conduct accordingly. However, this argument fails to acknowledge that the substantive right not to be discriminated against never wavered. The
Court did not sanction discrimination, but limited methods and burdens of proof, and generally reduced the effectiveness of the laws. 255
The Court made successfully bringing and winning a discrimination
action harder, but it did not make discrimination legal. Notice is only
a bar to retroactive laws if people would have changed their behavior
in light of the new rule. It is difficult to believe that employers knowingly engaged in discriminatory behavior in reliance on the 1989 standards and, if true, impossible to endorse. One district court rejected a
defendant's attempt to avoid retroactive application of the Act by noting, "the court finds it unlikely defendant would have acted differently
253. Wards Cove Packing Co., v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660 (1989).
254. Charles S. Ralston, Court vs. Congress: Judicial Interpretation of the Civil Rights Acts
and Congressional Response, 8 YALE L. & POLY. REv. 205, 213 (1990) (footnote omitted).
255. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (holding that§ 1981,
prohibiting discrimination in contracts, applies only to hiring decisions and not to postformation
actions); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (holding that the deadline for
filing a challenge to a seniority system begins to run when the practice is adopted and not when
workers are adversely impacted); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (holding that third parties
challenging an affirmative action consent decree can bring a collateral action to challenge the
settlement); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (overruling Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) by shifting the burden of proof to employees in disparate impact
cases to show that an employer's practice is not a business necessity); Price Waterhouse v. Hop·
kins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that an employer is not liable for making a biased employment
decisions as long as the same decision would have been made without the discriminatory factors).
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had it known its full potential liability."256 Another district court
stated that even if the defendant would have changed its behavior,
"[t]he law has never countenanced that an employer may weigh the
legal consequences of his discrimination and choose to continue his
unlawful conduct. An employer cannot pay for the right to discriminate because no such 'right' has ever existed."257 Since Title VII was
enacted, employers have been on continual notice that discriminatory
practices are subject to lawsuits.
In many cases, the actions forming the basis of discrimination
claims occurred before 1989.258 To deprive plaintiffs of the Act's remedies and restored legal standards would give defendants an unwarranted windfall gain. Applying the Act retroactively to pending cases
will actually protect the interests that arose before 1989 and that are
attached to cases still winding through the system. For such cases, it
is impossible to argue that retroactive application disturbs expectation
interests or deprives parties of notice. "[T]here is little injustice in
retroactively depriving a person of a right, however valuable, which
was created contrary to his bona fide expectations at the time he entered the transaction from which the right arose." 259 Furthermore,
many alleged discriminatory acts, such as sexual harassment and failure to promote, continue over extended periods of time, making it impossible to pinpoint the exact moment of a statutory violation. These
employment practices may have overlapped from the pre-1989 period
into 1989-1991 period. Applying the overruled standards to these
cases would allow employers to escape liability for long-term discriminatory practices merely because some of their actions occurred during
the window of time when the Supreme Court standards were in effect.
256. Graham v. Bodine Elec. Co., 782 F. Supp. 74, 77 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (applying the Act
retroactively). But see Sofferin v. American Airlines, 785 F. Supp. 780 (N.D. Ill. 1992):
If [the defendant] is proven to have committed the discriminatory actions .•• it could be
liable for thousands of dollars in punitive and compensatory damages not previously recoverable .•.. Applying such a change to the parties in this case would create substantial
liabilities that could not have been anticipated in 1985 and 1986, even by the most visionary.
Id. at 787.
257. Robinson v. Davis Memorial Goodwill Indus., No. 91-1085, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5331, at *23 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 1992).
258. See, e.g., Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370, 1372 (8th Cir. 1992) (discussed supra notes 190-200 and accompanying text); Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp.
1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992):
[T]he 1991 Civil Rights Act has simply returned the law to the position that is was in when
this complaint was filed in 1988, when Lucky designed its first affirmative action plan •••
when the E.E.O.C. issued its Determination finding reasonable cause to believe Lucky had
engaged in classwide discrimination, and when discovery began in this case.
Id. at 1308; see also Conerly v. CVN Cos., 785 F. Supp. 801 (D. Minn. 1992) (prospective application); Cook v. Foster Forbes Glass, 783 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (prospective application); Thompson v. Johnson & Johnson Management Info. Ctr., 783 F. Supp. 893 (D.N.J. 1992)
(prospective application); Graham v. Bodine Elec. Co., 782 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (retroac·
tive application); Mojica v. Gannett Co., 779 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (retroactive application); .
259. Hochman, supra note 9, at 720.
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The Act does go beyond the scope of the original Title VII by providing additional damage remedies and a jury trial option. Yet objections to these provisions are unavailing because employers do not have
an entrenched right to preserve particular procedures or remedies.
The rules in a heavily regulated area are constantly subject to change.
The Supreme Court has stated, "[t]hose who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end. " 260 The
amendments to Title VII in the Act serve to strengthen an existing
statutory scheme; for this reason, defendants have no "unconditional
right to limit plaintiffs to a particular type of remedy." 261 One district
court specifically rejected a challenge to the "new" provisions in the
Civil Rights Act in a suit alleging discrimination in failure to promote
on the basis of national origin.
[R]etroactive application of [the Act] will not affect existing rights or
give rise to new unanticipated obligations imposed upon any party without notice or an opportunity to be heard. The parties retain their due
process rights to fully litigate the issues, the only difference is that [plaintiff] will now be entitled to a jury trial on the issues of intentional discrimination and compensatory damages (a right long guaranteed in most
litigation by the Constitution and jealously guarded in the law) and to be
fully compensated for any harm she suffered by reason of discrimination.
By the same token, Defendant retains all its rights not to be subjected to
liability, unless and until [plaintifi] . . . bear[s] the burden of proof
262

Finally, employers were on notice that the Court's decisions engendered a huge amount of controversy. Almost immediately after the
decisions were announced, Congress introduced legislation to overturn
the decisions, and activity on Capitol Hill was widely publicized. 263
The 1989 decisions were in question almost immediately after the
Court issued them, putting employers on notice that the law was still
unsettled and subject to change.
260. Federal Haus. Admin. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958) (Douglas, J.). But see
Thompson, 783 F. Supp. at 897 ("In the instant case, plaintiff's claim .•• addresses conduct that
the [law] did not proscibe at the time the conduct occured.").
261. 780 F. Supp. at 1307-08; see also Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473,
486 n.16 (1981); New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917) ("No person has a
vested interest in any rule of law entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his
benefit."); Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1986) ("This is true after suit has
been filed and continues to be true until a final, unreviewable judgment is obtained.").
262. United States v. Department of Mental Health, 785 F. Supp. 846, 854 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
But see Sofferin v. American Airlines, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 780, 784 (N.D. Ill. 1992) ("[T]he Act
went well beyond the bounds of Supreme Court case law•.•. By adding these [provisions],
Congress destroyed a court's ability to construe the Act as remedial and therefore its retroactive
applicability.").
263. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text. Commentators have stated that "Fairness concerns are greatly attenuated when the persons retroactively deprived of ... rights had no
reasonable expectation that they would be able to keep them." EsKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra
note 13, at 276.
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c. The Act Does Not Target Vulnerable Groups. One objection
to retroactive laws is that lawmakers can use them to burden certain
groups unfairly. Justice Stevens addressed the concern that retroactive laws could target specific groups and individuals in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.:
Legislatures are primarily policymaking bodies that promulgate rules to
govern future conduct. The constitutional prohibitions against the enactment of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder reflect a valid concern
about the use of the political process to punish or characterize past conduct of private citizens. It is the judicial system, rather than the legislative process, that is best equipped to identify past wrongdoers and to
fashion remedies that will create the conditions that presumably would
have existed had not wrong been committed.264

These concerns fail to surface in the Civil Rights Act, which applies to
employers at large and does not target any specific group or industry. 265 While cause for suspicion would certainly arise if the Act
targeted a vulnerable group, the nation's employers hardly qualify as a
defenseless entity. Employers expressed a strong voice during the
shaping of the Act, and their lobbyists played an integral role in compromise negotiations. 266 Additionally, the President and conservative
members of Congress pushed a probusiness agenda and on the retroactivity issue continue to do so, along with the EEOC and the Department of Justice. 267 Overall, Congress granted business concerns
extensive consideration and allowed them a central role in shaping the
Act.26s
2. Applying the Civil Rights Act to Pending Cases Promotes Fairness
and Efficiency
Finally, application of the Act to pending cases best achieves fairness and efficiency. Courts presently must decide who should bear the
costs of congressional indecision, plaintiffs or defendants. Congress
264. 488 U.S. 469, 513-14 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (footnote omitted}.
265. The only targeting was aimed at the Wards Cove Packing Company, and it received a
special interest exemption from the entire Act. See supra note 134.
266. For instance, in shaping the modified version ofH.R. 1, concessions were made to make
the bill "more palatable to President Bush, congressional Republicans, and the business community." Revised Civil Rights Bill Will Cap Damages, Prohibit Job Quotas, DAILY REP. FOR EXEC·
UTJVES (BNA}, May 22, 1991 at A-16. Initially, the Business Roundtable, representing 200
major corporations, attempted to negotiate with civil rights groups. Joan Biskupic, Job Discrimination Legislation Roils Business Community, 49 CONG. Q. 989 (1991). In response, small businesses joined with the White House to pressure the Business Roundtable to end the negotiations.
"Small business and administration aides countered that the bigger companies, better equipped
to handle stepped-up antidiscrimination rules, were sacrificing the interests of their smaller
brethren." Id. The talks were called off.
267. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
268. This is most vividly seen in the special interest exemption for the Wards Cove defendahts, proposed by the Senators from Alaska to protect a business in their state. Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 402(b}, 105 Stat. 1071, 1099 (1991).
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clearly meant to protect plaintiffs who utilize the Civil Rights Act and
effectuate the national policy against workplace discrimination. Yet to
disallow retroactivity imposes costs of congressional inaction on the
very class of parties most entitled to protection and least likely to be
able to shoulder the cost.
The Supreme Court has previously sanctioned placing the costs of
retroactive legislation on employers. In Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 269 the Court upheld federal mine legislation that required
mine operators to pay disability benefits to miners affiicted with black
lung disease, including miners who had left employment before the
passage of the law. The Court supported retroactive liability as "a
rational measure to spread the costs of the employees' disabilities to
those who have profited from the fruits of their labor." 270 Such an
approach is eminently fair for the Civil Rights Act. It places the costs
on the beneficiaries of discriminatory behavior.
Moreover, to deny retroactive application of the Act to pending
cases would also mean that, for years to come, two different standards
would apply to discrimination claims. Representative Edwards revealed this anomaly: "[O]ne set of decisions would explicate law as
Congress has enacted it, and the other would further develop fine
points of the law under Wards Cove, Patterson, Lorance, Price
Waterhouse, etc., long after Congress has repudiated these decisions."271 Promulgating unnecessary standards would be a tremendous waste of judicial resources. Courts would spend time researching
and refining rejected legal standards rather than developing institutional expertise in applying the current law. It is more efficient for
courts to focus on carrying out the purpose of the Civil Rights Act
than to keep repeating the mistakes that Congress overruled. To effectuate the statutory purpose, courts should concentrate on interpreting
the existing law and not on belaboring interpretations that Congress
rejected.
CONCLUSION

When Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it overruled
several Supreme Court interpretations of Title VII. Congress ham269. 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
270. 428 U.S. at 18. The Court also occasionally invokes a canon of construction that instructs courts to interpret civil rights questions on behalf of disadvantaged groups. This canon
insures that "regulatory statutes are not defeated in the implementation process." Sunstein,
supra note 230, at 483. This canon is most commonly used in the interpretation of statutes
affecting Native Americans. See EsKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 13, at 655 (citing Montana v.
Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985)). Also, faced with ambiguous statutes, the Court has sanctioned this interpretive norm by creating implied rights on behalf of minorities. Allen v. State
Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (interpreting the Voting Rights Act); Sunstein, supra note
230, at 484 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 687-717 (1979) (interpreting
Title IX)).
271. 137 CoNG. REc. H9530-31 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Edwards).

2078

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 90:2035

mered out its policy against workplace discrimination during two
years of extensive negotiation, and debates over applying the Act to
past and pending cases remained particularly controversial. Although
the 1990 Act contained an explicit retroactivity provision, Congress
dropped this provision during the compromise process. Knowing the
courts would ultimately address the issue, Congress sacrificed statutory specificity in order to ensure the bill's passage. Courts, however,
have been equally incapable of reaching a consensus on the Act's
applicability.
The confusion is an inevitable result of the Supreme Court's schizophrenic doctrine. Two competing canons of construction govern retroactivity - one presumes retroactivity while the other presumes
prospectivity. ·Thus, precedent fails to provide a workable framework
for interpreting statutes that are ambiguous as to their retroactive application. Rather than resolving the tension between the presumptions, courts should focus on the potential effects of retroactive
statutes. Under this approach, courts screen for the potential dangers
of retroactivity, ensuring that a statute does not unduly upset settled
expectations, deprive parties of notice, or target vulnerable groups.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not implicate any of the concerns that make retroactivity potentially undesirable. The Act restores prior understandings of Title VII while promoting the goals of
fairness and efficiency. When Congress enacted the Restoration Act of
1987 to clarify prior legislation, the majority of courts deferred to the
legislative intent and applied the new Act retroactively to pending
cases. Like the Restoration Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 remedies restrictive court interpretations of civil rights laws. The Civil
Rights Act of 1991 reaffirms the principles embodied in Title VII, and
only retroactive application of the Act can fulfill the Court's obligation
to effectuate legislative intent by eradicating discrimination from the
American workplace.

